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ABSTRACT
Russian-Moldovan Relations after the Collapse of the
Soviet Union
Anna Napieralska

After the break-up of the Soviet Empire a newborn Republic of Moldova faced a series
of challenges, one of which was creating the political and economic foundations that would
allow it to become the sustainable European country. It proved to be an extremely difficult
task. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990’s Moldova was widely known as the poorest and the
least economically stable country on the old continent. During the first years of independence
the Moldovan leaders realized that the greatest challenge would be to limit Russian influences
on the domestic and foreign policy of the country. Since the Russian Federation, the principal
successor state of the Soviet Union, considered Moldova to be of the highest strategic
importance it wanted to ensure that Moldova would remain under the Russian sphere of vital
interests. Unfortunately for Moldova it also meant that Kremlin wanted it to remain
impoverished and divided, and thus, easier to control. Support for the self-proclaimed
Dniestrian Moldovan Republic became one of the effective tools of Moscow in pursuing its
own vision of Kishinev’s position on the European scene.
The current study presents the Russian foreign policy strategy toward the Republic of
Moldova after the collapse of the Soviet Union and shows how the weak and small country
had to struggle with outside influences on its domestic affairs. It also argues that it has been in
Russia’s best interests to maintain the current Moldovan status quo in order to be able to
prevent it from strengthening cooperation with Western players, particularly NATO and the
EU. The study examines in detail the various mechanisms of Russian foreign policy that were
aimed at balancing the Western influences in Moldova. Finally it argues that for over the past
twenty years the Kremlin has not hesitated to use blackmail, especially on trade issues, which
has significantly inhibited the Moldovan process of transformation into a democratic and
sustainable

state.
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INTRODUCTION

For the citizens of the territories behind the Iron Curtain the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 and the changes brought by it signified the beginning of new era. Everything what
constituted the existence of the Soviet republics suddenly disappeared: the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, the Soviet system of state socialism, Marxist ideology and central
planning. The dissolution of the Soviet state resulted in the creation of numerous independent
states that had to face several challenges and difficulties which accompanied the transition. 1 One
of the great examples of a post-Soviet country struggling with those difficulties is Republic of
Moldova, which declared the independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991. The
newborn country already at the beginning of 1990s confronted many of the challenges facing the
ex-Soviet republics – economic decline, political turmoil, and inter-ethnic discord2. The lack of
the political consensus between political leaders regarding economic policies, failed attempts to
initiate structural reforms as well as a lack of qualified cadres to serve in the local administration
had resulted in the significant deterioration of the economic situation. On the top of Moldova’s

1

Manuel Irman, Moldovan Division after the Collapse of the USSR: Russia's Role i\n the Transitional Process of
Moldova and its Renegade Province Transnistria ( Zurich: GRIIN, 2010), p.6.
2
Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition (Chisinou: Center for Romanian Studies, 1997), p.
16.
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internal issues, the country had to face the challenging task of establishing relations with the
Russian Federation.
Russo-Moldovan relations after the breakdown of Soviet Empire became a main focus of
foreign policy conducted by the government in Chisinau. Due to Moldova’s geopolitical position,
even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union Moscow’s stance remained an important factor in
the Chisinau decision-making process. Thus, Russian authorities, not surprisingly, have been
taking advantage of that position interfering systematically in Bessarabian politics. 3 As Ella
Akerman rightly puts it, “Russia had neither experience nor traditions in establishing interstate
relations with the former Union republics, and consequently did not succeed to formulate a
positive foreign policy taking into account its national and state interests.” 4 Moscow usurped the
right to have a major influence in the region, making it “a zone of its vital interest” 5. One of best
examples of Russian politics is its military intervention in the Moldovan civil war in 1992. Thus,
Russo-Moldovan relations after 1991 is the focus of this thesis, as an excellent example of how
Russians understand their role in post-Soviet space as well as how the post-Soviet country
struggles with pleasing its most important international partner.
There are a couple of reasons for which the research on Russo-Moldovan relations is so
important. First of all, the shape of relations between Moldova and Russia in the aftermath of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union reveals the real attitude of Russian Federation toward the EU and
NATO as well as raises important questions about Russian policy toward Europe's newborn
3

Although historically (before the annexation by Russians) the name Bessarabia denoted the area of Moldova
between the Prut river and Black Sea , Russian diplomacy extended the term to the entire territory between Prut and
Dniester river. Source: Andrei Brezianu, Historical Dictionary of Republic of Moldova (Lanhaim: The Scarecrov
Press,2001), p.20-21.
4
Ella Akerman, Implications Of Russia's Foreign And Security Policy On Moldova, (Ardeen: Scottish Centre for
International Security), access online 30 March 2012:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGcQFjAH&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fleader.viitorul.org%2Fpublic%2F530%2Fen%2FImplications_Russia_policy.doc&ei=8bCZT4njO8mJ6AH
b3-zvBg&usg=AFQjCNHQzuIJCpLKxXv8Lgby9V_IqjstwA&sig2=Xb76qX2RtCOR9WIgoHH5-g
5
Ibid.
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states. One of that main goals of the Kremlin's policy is to maintain Moldova's “political
independence” not only from the Romania's influence but most of all, from becoming a member
of the EU. The example of the Russian role within the Chisinau’s politics, especially concerning
potential Moldova – EU integration, which Moscow categorically opposes, might serve as eyeopener for those who claimed that EU – Russian relations are based on a mature partnership.
Another factor that makes the relations between Moldova and Russia so significant is the
fact that the Russian policy toward Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic mirrors the schematic
policy toward other breakaway territories like Abkhazia or South Ossetia. In that sense the
Transnistrian case serves as an excellent case study of Russian neo - imperialistic attempts to
influence (or blackmail) the former republics of the Soviet Union. Hence, the current study will
help to answer the question whether the foreign policy of Moscow towards Moldova is another
instance of attempting to regain control and influence over a former Soviet colony, the expression
of Russian inability of breaking with the Soviet past, or a “harder” version of Russian “soft
power”.
There is also another aspect of the Russian policy worth analyzing. Namely, the official
attitude of the government in Moscow toward Russians who, after disintegration of Soviet Union,
found themselves living in the newly independent states. As Russians constitute almost 10
percent of the population of Moldova (and over 30 percent of Transnistria and Bender) their
presence remains an important element of the Russian policy toward Chisinau. Thus the constant
involvement of Russia into the politics of Moldova’s independent state is often excused as the
need to defend the interests of the Russian minority living in Moldovan territory. In the current
study the question how in practice the Russian policy influences the coexistence of different
ethnic groups in Moldova will be answered.

3

It is also necessary to point out what kind of impact the relations between Moscow and
Chisinau have on the economic and social situation in Bessarabia. In order to do so, this thesis is
going to include not only the description of the different types of trade, political, cooperative,
enterprise and custom agreements but it will also scrutinize their short and long - term impacts on
the Moldovan society and economy. Moreover, this study will focus on the impact that Russian
policy has had on the Moldovan political scene by analyzing economic sanctions, political
pressures and the influence of Russian interest groups.
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that the Republic of Moldova and its relationship
with its neighbors seem to be completely omitted by both English and Russian - speaking
scholars. In fact, in the English - speaking world, there are only two well-known professors, both
from United States who are specializing in the Moldovan studies and are publishing books and
articles on Moldovan nation - building, the current political situation and the Soviet – Romanian
dispute over Bessarabia after World War I– Charles King and Nicholas Dima.6 The author was
not able to find any comprehensive study on the Russia-Moldova relationship in the aftermath of
Soviet's collapse, either in the Russian or English language.
In order to explain all the issues mentioned above the current paper includes
comprehensive analysis of the historical background of the relationship between the two
countries. Although this part of the research greatly exceeds the observed period for this thesis,
including it is necessary for couple of reasons. First, the modern history of Moldova is strictly
related to history of the Russian Empire, since after 1812 Moldovan territory was under Russian
rule. More than century of Russian government, which implemented a harsh policy of
6

e.g. Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition (Chisinou: Center for Romanian Studies,
1997); Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 2001); Nicholas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian Territorial Dispute (New York:
Colambia University Press, 1982).
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colonialism and russification, resulted in growing antagonism between Russian authorities and
the native inhabitants. Moreover, one can notice some similarities between the policy conducted
by the Russian Federation and the one that was an attribute of Russian Empire at the beginning of
twentieth century, such as a ban on Moldovan wine or import sanctions. Finally, the Soviet
authorities, while ruling the Romanian territory of Bessarabia in accordance with RibbentropMolotov accords, in order to maintain its independence from Romania commenced the Moldovan
nation - building process. This finally led to the creation of the independent Moldovan state and
distinct nation in 1991
The first chapter of this thesis presents the history of the Moldovan territory under the
rule of the Russian Empire after 1812. It includes the basic components of Russian policy toward
the new province, the description of the russification process and colonization of the region as
well as the native inhabitants’ response towards it. Later, the main focus of the chapter becomes
the interwar and the years from 1941 to 1991 when Moldavia became one of the 15 republics
subordinated directly to the government of the Soviet Union. The second chapter is devoted to
analyzing the Moldova-Russia relations after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It begins with the
description of the Moldovan civil war in the early 90's and Russian involvement in the conflict. It
later takes under the scrutiny the numerous attempts to settle the Transnistrian conflict and the
foreign policy strategies of both countries. Finally, the last chapter shows the changes in the
Moldovan-Russian co-operation that were brought by XXI century. It presents how the rule of
Moldovan communists influenced the relationship between the states as well as how the
Moldova’s geopolitical position between East and West contributed to the political impasse in the
country.
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Chapter I
Historical Background of Russian-Moldovan
relations

1. Introduction to the History of the region

The history of Moldova from its very beginning is strictly connected with the history of
the Romanian nation. The Romanian Principality of Moldova, inhabited mostly by DacoRomans, predecessors of the Romanians, came into being between the Carpathian Mountains and
the Dniester River in the early fourteenth century and was founded by the Wallachian prince from
Maramures. Medieval Moldova covered the so-called Carpathian – Danube – Dniester region,
from Transylvania in the west to the Dniester River in the east. It is worth noting that shortly
before the emergence of the new state, the area between the Prut and Dniester rivers – the
motherland of Moldovans - belonged to the Wallachian dynasty Bessarab, after whom the entire
province was named Bessarabia7.

7

Nicholas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian Territorial Dispute (New York: Colambia
University Press, 1982) p. 10.
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Map 1 The Medieval Principality of Moldova8

The Romanian inhabitants of the Principality of Moldova migrated to the area, according
to Hungarian sources, from the northern parts of Transylvania at the beginning of first
millennium. They unified the people already living in the territory and organized the territory into

8

B.a., The Medieval Principality of Moldova, CIA World Factbook, accessed online 21 September 2012,
http://www.google.com/imgres?um=1&hl=pl&sa=N&biw=1920&bih=843&tbm=isch&tbnid=7OXWnXprRYgEmM
:&imgrefurl=http://www.answers.com/topic/moldova&docid=zbOn4D8wi2_fDM&imgurl=http://content.answcdn.c
om/main/content/img/factbook/maps/md-map.gif&w=328&h=713&ei=2FlUNGWHMfQsgbym4DgBA&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=1198&vpy=232&dur=2227&hovh=331&hovw=152&tx=8
7&ty=175&sig=112031022142017531206&page=2&tbnh=123&tbnw=56&start=56&ndsp=68&ved=1t:429,r:18,s:5
6,i:306
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a state9. The other ethnic groups that started to settle in the region from the sixth century were
mostly Slavs and Tatars, but they cohabited with the locals and they were absorbed fully by them
within the first centuries of coexistence. Although by the end of the fourteenth century Moldova
had grown in strength and quickly became an important power in southeastern Europe, its
geographical location made it vulnerable to the attacks of the Ottoman Turks, Hungarians, and
Poles10.The young state of Moldova for decades had to fight to defend its independence.
Eventually, in 1512 the province agreed to pay tribute to the Ottoman Sultan and thus became a
vassal state to the Ottoman Porte, yet it enjoyed relative autonomy within the Empire. The
following centuries were marked by continuous struggle among the great European powers at that
time: Austria, Turkey, and Russia – over Southeastern Europe11. During the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries the Russian Empire begun to expand into southern Ukraine, dangerously
drawing near to the Bessarabian territory. Simultaneously, the process of disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire resulted in the dismemberment of Moldovan territory. Firstly, in 1774 the
northwestern part of principality (Bukovina) was ceded to the Habsburg Empire and then, the rest
of historical Moldova between the Prut and Dniester (Bessarabia) was incorporated by Russia12.

9

Marcel Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule: Diplomatic History from the Archives of the
Great Powers (New York: Algora Publishing, 2002), p.18.
10
The principality of Moldavia lied directly on the north-south trading route linking the Hanseatic states with the
Genoese and Byzantine settlements along the Dniester River and the Black Sea. The Principality also stood at the
center of the conflict between the Poles, Hungarians and Ottomans after the fifteenth century as often collaborating
with foreign invaders as standing together against them. Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the
Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), p.14.
11
Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…,p.11.
12
Ibid.,p.10.
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2. The First Annexation of Bessarabia and Russian Rule, 1812 – 1918

At the time of annexation, the Bessarabian territory - 17,350 square miles, included
between 240, 000 and 350, 000 people, most of whom were Romanian- speaking Moldovans13.
Due to the unstable international position of the Empire (the war with France), the region’s great
distance from the Russian capital and finally the poor condition of the Russian finances, in the
first phase of Russian domination, Bessarabia was able to gain a privileged status within the
empire.14 In the first phase of Russian domination, the unstable international position of Empire,
the war going on with France, the territories great distance to Russian capital and finally the poor
condition of the Russian finances resulted in granting Bessarabia a privileged status15.The
Russian government decided to give the region certain autonomy, including the preservation of
the Ottoman privileges and the application of traditional Moldovan laws and customs.
Nevertheless, knowing the horrible situation in the areas earlier incorporated to Russia, tens of
thousands Moldovan families decided to move to the western bank of the Prut River. Moreover,
Moldovan boyars did not recognize the Russian incorporation of the area, arguing that the Turks
could not cede the right to the Moldovan territory, as it was not a Turkish province but just a
vassal of Turkey and that “the Sultan had no right to accept the cession of territory without their
consent.”16 Nevertheless, owing to the intention to create an example of how Russia would treat
the territories which had belonged to Ottomans, the new acquisition was not subjected to the
13

Historians despute the actual number of inhabitants at the time of annexation: Nistor, Istoria
Bessarabiei(Bucharest: Humanitast, 1991), 197.; Popovici Andrei, The political status of Bessarabia
(Washington:Randsell, 1931), 80 ; King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politic,p.19.
14
Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20.
15
Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20.
16
King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.19.
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same oppressive measures as other territories of the Russian Empire.17Tsar Alexander I allowed
the Bessarabian nobles, led by Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni, to constitute a civil government and
under the special rule established in 1818, Moldovans were given wide latitude in the local
government, with Moldovan language serving alongside Russian as an official language of the
local administration. 18 Autonomy was also given to the local Orthodox church which maintained
independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. Marcel Mitrasca, a scholar of diplomatic history
affiliated with Babes Bolyai University, claims that Russia's policy toward Bessarabia was not
only the result of the international tensions and domestic problems of the Empire, but mainly the
result of Tsar Alexander’s tactic to “win over the inhabitants.”19 The Russian Tsar, while giving
instructions to the boyars loyal to Empire, said: “The public burdens must be equally distributed:
the honesty of the administrative officials must make the inhabitants forget the lack of a regular
system of laws, let the inhabitants feel the advantage of the fatherly and liberal administration.
Draw the attention of neighboring people to this province by making it happy.”20
Yet Moldovans did not enjoy privileged treatment for long as Russian policy soon
changed. The death of the Moldovan leader Banulescu-Bodoni in 1821 resulted in the growing
assertiveness of the boyars which, in turn, resulted in retracting many of the privileges and rights
given in the first years of annexation.21 The immediately deteriorating situation of the local
nobles and the change for the worse in the economy led to the boyars’ insurrection in 1821. The
Bessarabians did not need to wait long for the Russian response. In 1829 the autonomous
Province of Moldova became a Russian Gubernia, which meant in practice the end of the special
17

Bruchis, Michael, The Republic of Moldova: From the Collapse of the Soviet Empire to the Restoration of the
Russian Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.11.
18
Nistor, Istoria Besarabiei…, p.228-231.
19
Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20.
20
Quoted in: Robert William Seton-Watson, The history of Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Completion of
Unity (Oxford: Veda Publishing House, 1963), p.32.
21
King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.22.
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status of the region within the Empire. Meanwhile, the newly crowned Tsar Nicholas I did not
approve Alexander’s tactic toward newly incorporated lands as he was rather a believer in a
policy of fast colonization and russification of new provinces. He wanted an extension of central
control over the newly acquired western territories.22 In order to do so, in 1829 the old
constitution of Bessarabia was replaced by a new one drafted by the governor of New Russia, M.
S. Vorontsov. The laws resulted in practice in a steady process of cultural deterioration. It lifted
the obligatory usage of the native inhabitants’ language in public administration and primary
schools.23 In time, the Moldovan language was also removed from Orthodox church services and
Romanian books, newspapers and periodicals form west of the Prut river were prohibited while
the Moldovan ones were not allowed to publish.
A policy of colonization and russification was continued for several decades with the
purpose of “increasing the population and weakening the Romanian element in the province. “24
Although at the beginning of the introduction of the new policy the primary goal of colonization
was to bring as many people to the newly acquired territories to better exploit the land, later the
Russian authorities realized that this policy was also helping to diminish the Romanian character
of the region. Davide Zafi, in his article “Moldovan-Russian Political Relations in Recent
History” describes the Empire’s policy of colonization by saying “The Russian government had
to resort to incentives for a strong immigration in order to take under cultivation the ground
abandoned to itself. New comers were foremost Slavs, but not only: Turks (Gagauz), Bulgarians,
Germans, French, Poles also settled in the area and added to its already traditional national

22

King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.22.
Bruchis, The Republic of Moldova: From the Collapse of the Soviet Empire…, p.12.
24
Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20.
23
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medley.”25 From the Empire's point of view, this kind of attitude toward newly “liberated”
provinces from Turkish infidels was their “Christian” duty. For instance, twentieth century’s
Russian historiography presents the annexation of Bessarabia as a liberation of the Christian
population form the Turks, justified by the brotherhood of religion.26
Russian rule over Bessarabia was suddenly disturbed by the western powers who, alarmed
by the Russian expansion around the shores of Black Sea, decided to wage a war against the
empire. The so-called Crimean War ended with the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1856, which forced
the Russian Empire to withdraw from the Southern part of Bessarabia, adjacent to Danube River,
and the region was restored to the Moldovan Province. 27 The Empire, along with other European
great powers, agreed to respect the integrity of the Romanian regions and its national
administration. The Romanian authorities immediately began the process of Romanization,
focusing on reversing the Russian reforms, establishing Romanian schools and publishing houses
as well as introducing the Romanian language in public administration. However, the Romanian
efforts to bring about the full Romanian integration of the province appeared to very ineffective
as ironically the incorporated lands were the very districts where the Romanian population was
the least numerous.28 Later on though, through the agreement between Hungary, Austria and
Russia in 1878 the Russian Empire managed to take back the lost territories. That resulted in the
intensification of the russification process: all the publications in native language were
suppressed and the policy of altering the demographic situation in the newly-conquered land
strengthened. For example, while in the first decade of the annexation the Romanian speakers
25

Davide Zafi, Moldavian-Russian Political Relations in Recent History (Rome: Centro Studi Sulla Storia Dell’
Europa Orientale, 2002) , access online 12 April 2012: http://www.csseo.org/Papers/MoldovaDZ.pdf
26
Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule, 21.; George F Jewsburry, The Russian annexation
of Bessarabia 1777 – 1828. A Study of Imperial Expansion (Boulder : East European Monographs, No. 28, 1977),
p.55.
27
Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…,p.14.
28
The region was later incorporated into the Ukrainian soviet Republic and was never recovered by the Moldavian
Republic, Seton-Watson, The History of Romanians: From Roman Times…, p.562.
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constituted around the 74% of the population of Bessarabia (990 000) by the end of the century
Romanian speakers were only 47.6% of the entire population (1, 930, 000).29The ethnic structure
was different in urban and rural areas. While the cities were almost entirely populated by the
Russians and Jews30 with strong anti- Romanian attitude, it was mainly Moldovans who
populated the villages.

31

This situation was strictly related to the high level of illiteracy among

the Romanian-speaking population. Russified institutions did not reach the Moldovan peasants as
they all spoke a different language and did not need to learn Russian just for working on rural
farms. As a result, by the end of the century only 10.5 % of Moldovan men and 1.7% Moldovan
women could read and write in any language.32
As Nicholas Dima pointedly puts it, the nineteenth century’s “Russian management of
Bessarabia was a disaster.”33 The whole province remained highly underdeveloped and the
population, especially Moldovans, remained overwhelmingly illiterate. The language of the
native inhabitants was almost completely eliminated from public life. 34 Moreover, the region had
the highest mortality rate in Europe - 50 percent higher than in the empire.
Nevertheless, during the entire period of Russian rule, Moldovans did not lose their
linguistic and ethnic (not national) identity. All the writers and artists form Bessarabia and
Bukovina like Georghr Asachi, Costache Negruzzi or Bogdan Petrieceicu Hesdeu considered
themselves to be Romanians and their language to be Romanian, as in their historical homeland

29

The actual percentage of Romanian speakers could have been higher since the 1897 census tended to count all
persons with some knowledge of Russian language as “Russians”; King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the
Politics…,p.23.
30
Over 50, 000 Jews were living in Chisinau in 1897, accounting for nearly half the population.
31
Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.21.
32
B.a.,Pervaia vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naselenia Rossiskoi imprerii, 1897 g., vol.20: Bessarabskaia gubernia,
(S.Petersburg: 1905), p.130.
33
Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…, p.16.
34
Popovici, The political status of… , 96-109.

13

of ancient Dacia.35 For all the prominent Moldovan figures as well as for Romanian authorities,
the unification of the old Romanian provinces was the main goal at that time. Even some of the
Russian administrators acknowledged this possibility, seeing how difficult it was to integrate the
native inhabitants with the new-comers and within the Russian administration. For instance, the
famous General A. N. Kuropatkin wrote in his work published in 1910 that “the population of
Bessarabia lived in isolation and aloof form Russians” and that in the future the unification of
Moldovans with the Romania might be inevitable.36 On the other hand, the Russian
administration at that time did not argue that Romanians and Moldovans formed different nations
(unlike during the Soviet administration when the theory of Moldovans forming a nation distinct
form the Romanian one was a core principle). Although the last thing Russians wanted was the
unification of the Romanian nation, their main concern was to extinguish any manifestations of
non- Russian nationalism and to create a sense of loyalty to the Empire.

37

In the official

documents, the term Moldovans was used only as an historical name of the population of
Bessarabia, not to define Bessarabians as separate nation from Romania.
Yet the national and ethnic self-consciousness among Moldovans was already awakened.
The first stimulus for the national movement was already the Crimean War of 1853-1856 as it
provided an excellent opportunity to liberate Bessarabia form the Russian occupiers. Later, the
Russian revolution of 1905 and the outburst of indignation in the country forced Tsar Nicholas to
repeal some legislation against ethnic minorities.38 Publishing newspapers and periodicals in
native language was again allowed. Using this opportunity, young Bessarabian intellectuals
influenced by the social radicalism in the whole Empire, together with a few Moldovan nobles,
35
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founded Moldovan newspaper called Bessarabia. The publishers’ main goals were to spread the
message of national awakening to the Moldovan peasants, to call for land reform and unification
with Romania, as well as to promote the idea of the introduction of the Romanian language in the
schools and public administration.39 Besides the emergence of a pan-Romanian nationalist
movement, other Moldovan political groups appeared at that time. For instance, the group
involved the publication of a second Moldovan newspaper, Moldovanul, gathered mostly the
Moldovan nobles who, although they called for economic emancipation of the region, stayed
loyal to the Russian authorities.

40

The most active representative of this group and at the same

time the main editor of Moldovanul, Gheorghe Madan, would become the chief propagator of
Moldovian language as distinct from Romanian. Finally, there were also groups opposed to the
Moldovan nationalists like the League of True Russians or Union of Russian People which
gathered mostly non-Moldovan inhabitants.
The turbulence of the First World War, especially the October revolution of 1917 allowed
the nationalists to implement all of their demands. The newly created Moldovan National Party
openly requested from the Russian authorities in Chisinau introduction of the principles of
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion.

41

Not waiting for the official response,

Moldovan soldiers along with peasants and workers organized the Sfatul Tarii (the State Council)
and on December 2 1917, declared Bessarabia an autonomous republic.42 The proclamation of the
Sfatul Tarii stated: ”from now on Bessarabia declares itself the Moldovan Democratic Republic,
which will enter the make-up of the Russian Democratic Federative Republic as participant with
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equal rights.”43 A month later, seeing the lack of response from the Russian side, nationalists took
the opportunity and declared Moldova an independent state. However, the threat of Ukrainian
intervention as well as Russian military action forced some of the districts to call for Romanian
help which in effect resulted, on March 27 1918, in the proclamation of the unification of the
Democratic Republic of Moldova with Romania.

3. Soviet Policies on the Romanian Border. Creation of MASSR

It is not difficult to picture the Russian reaction to such a course of the events. For Soviet
authorities, the 1918 Union between Bessarabia and Romania was a military, violent annexation
of Russian territory by taking advantage of the situation in Russia at the end of the First World
War. Not surprisingly, Romanians saw it from a completely different perspective. Romanian
historiography places the event in the context of the long expected union of the historically
Romanian provinces into one state, Greater Romania.44 Yet, the newly created Soviet Union did
not want to let Bessarabia go and soon commenced an extensive propaganda in order to get back
the lost territory as soon as possible. For instance, already in 1918 the first propaganda brochures
read that “Romania had about as much right to Bessarabia as, let us say, Russia had to Ireland, or
to some provinces belonging to France, Italy , or Japan.”45 On the international scene, the Soviets
liked to present the annexation as an unlawful action as Bessarabia did not belong to Romania in
a period preceding Russian rule but to Turkey and therefore there was no possibility for re43
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unification.

46

Nicholas Dima, a specialist on Romanian history form Columbia University,

pointedly comments on this argument by saying that this line of argument automatically
eliminated Russian right to Bessarabia because USSR, like Romania, did not exist at that time
either.47
The Russian rule over Bessarabia left the region in very poor condition - the infrastructure
and economic backwardness was unspeakable. Little more than 90 miles of paved roads was built
during the Russian government, which additionally became inaccessible during the heavy rain.48
Moreover, Russian authorities had built “ 657 miles of railroad in the Gubernia before 1917, but
since the railways were designed for strategic rather than economic purposes, they connected
Bessarabian cities with Russia and Ukraine but not with each other; the primitive state of the
rolling stock , as well as Russian broad-gauge track, also proved to be major problems.”49 Trade
with neighboring countries also declined significantly from the moment of reunion with
Romania. Moldovan wine, one of the main export products, was banned by the Soviets while
Poland, trying to maintain good relations with Russia, tore up the trade agreements with main
Moldovan manufacturers. As we will see in the next chapters of this study, such economic
sabotage was not only characteristic of Soviet policy toward border territories, but will also be
the strategy of the contemporary Russian government.
However, the wretched economic state of Bessarabia did not frighten away the Soviets.
When the Russian efforts to prevent the ratification of Peace Treaty by the great European powers
failed, Russians came up with “plan B”.
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The new Soviet strategy consisted of spreading
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communist propaganda across the borders of Romanian Moldova and thus find Bessarabian
supporters of reunion with Russia. In order to do so, the Soviet Union commenced the publishing
of a communist newspaper in Romanian Plugarul Rosu (The Red Plowman), used to spread
Marxist propaganda. Additionally, Bolshevik agents were very active in the Moldovan
countryside; Soviet planes dropped pamphlets everywhere when occasionally shots were
exchanged between Russian and Romanian solders.51 Part of the above-mentioned plan was also
the creation of Obshchestvo Bessarabtsev (the Bessarabia Association) in Moscow which was
responsible for the agitating for Moldova’s reunion with the Soviets on the international scene,
especially in France and Germany. This intensive Soviet agitation resulted in the outburst of three
anti-capitalist risings in Bessarabian towns: Hotin and Bender in 1919 and Tatar Bunar in
1924.The brutal suppression of the last one became an excellent opportunity for the Soviets. 52 In
September 1924, one of the Plugarul Rosu’s issues published the letter from Moldoan peasants
who asked for creation of an autonomous communist republic.

53

Meanwhile Moscow started

recruiting the leadership for a future communist state. As a result, on October 12 1924, the Soviet
Union announced the establishment of Moldavian Autonomous Oblast on land east of the
Dniester river in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with the capital in Balta, in present-day
Ukraine.54 Seven months later, the Oblast was upgraded to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR, also called Transnistria) , although its population was only
30% ethnic Moldovans while Ukrainians made up over 49% of all inhabitants.

55

Its surface area

was only 8, 300 square kilometers.56
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The chief aim of Moscow’s decisions was not the creation of the republic itself but rather
to induce Moldovans living in Romania to agitate for reunification with the Soviet Union and put
the pressure on Romania in negotiations over Moldovan’s future.57 For instance, Nicholas Dima
argues that this kind of strategy was used by the Russians in 1920s in the cases of the KareloFinish Socialist Republic, in the Tadzhik Republic in Central Asia Buriat-Mongol Autonomous
Republic: Russians worked through communist agitation toward incorporation into certain
territory into the Soviet empire.58 Immediately after the creation of MASSR, which later was also
called Transnistria, the Soviets begun to speak of Moldovans as if they were another nation,
different form Romanians. That was also the part of the Russians’ policy on border regions. They
used the propaganda of national liberation to draw those lands away from “the capitalist states”
like Romania or Finland.59 But the data from the first years following the emergence of MASSR
in an eloquent testimony that the republic was the artificially created administrative-political
formation aimed at serving as a permanent reminder of Russia's firm stand on Bessarabia. 60 For
instance, the party regional committee, the chief authority at that moment, consisted mainly of
non-Moldovan Bessarabian activists, while in the Moldavian Communist Party at the end of
1924, there were only 6.3% of Moldovans representatives.61
In the 1920s the notion that Moldovans constituted a separate ethno - national group was
the Bolsheviks’ crucial argument against Romanian possession of Bessarabia. Therefore, the first
years after the birth of Transnistria were marked by Moldovan nation-building. The so-called
“process of “Moldovianization” was mainly focused on creation of a distinct Moldovan literary
language and education of the peasants and thus bringing them into the structures of “genuinely
57
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Moldovan republic” and more importantly, into the communist party.62 For example, in 1925 the
first dictionary of the Moldovan language was published using the Cyrillic alphabet instead of
Latin script just in order to make the language less similar to Romanian. On top of that, the
Soviets introduced preferential hiring and promotion for the benefit of non-Russian nationalities,
began the program of building Moldovan schools and promoting the use of indigenous languages
in education, as well as commenced the project of lowering the illiteracy level among Moldovan
woman.
Meanwhile, during the entire interwar period communist activists as well as Soviet agents
in Romania were involved in a range of Soviet agitprop activities aimed at organizing the
revolution in Romanian Bessarabia. However it did not produce the expected results. The main
reason why the “export of revolution“ failed was that although Moldovan peasants “were hardly
enthusiastic about the presence of Romanian gendarmes and soldiers”, they were even less
supportive of Soviet calls for the Collectivization of land and expropriation of peasant property. 63
Not without significance was the legacy of Russian rule over Bessarabia in the previous century.
Moldovans remembered very well how the Russian empire’s authorities harshly treated the native
inhabitants and therefore preferred to stay within the newly created Greater Romania than to risk
returning to Russian government. A similar process can be seen in the more recent history of
relations between those two nations after the collapse of Soviet Union which will be described in
the next chapter.
In the given situation, the Soviet Union was forced to abandon its aggressive
international policy and to temporarily accept Romanian possession of the province. Between
1928 and 1939 Romania and the USSR signed a series of bilateral treaties that were concluded

62

King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.70.
King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.51.

63

20

with the exchange of ambassadors and the establishing of diplomatic relations in 1934. Moreover,
during the same year the USSR asked to be a member of the League of Nations and Romania, an
important state in the organization, was a great supporter of it.

64

Thus the Soviet Union became

constrained to obey the international legal provisions created by the League, which included the
territorial integrity of the member states.65The dispute over the status of Bessarabia became loud
again with the signing by the Soviets of the Ribbentrop - Molotov treaty which in the secret
protocol indicated the Soviet sphere of influence over the entire eastern Europe, including the
territory of Romanian Bessarabia.
Simultaneously in Tansnistria the Soviet nation-building policy underwent significant
changes. In the years 1937 and 1938 the Stalinist purges and the massive ethnic cleansing
continued. This sudden shift away from the policy of nation-building was, according to the theory
of Terry Martin the result of the Soviet xenophobia. However, by Soviet xenophobia Martin does
not mean the traditional reluctance toward foreigners but “the exaggerated Soviet fear of foreign
influence and foreign contamination.”66 The Soviet national consolidation projects throughout
the 1920’s gave a certain freedoms and rights to the Soviet nationalities what, in torn, awakened
the Russian’s suspicious of foreign capitalist countries influencing the Soviet regions.
In effect the party-state activists of Autonomous Republic together with leading cadres of
culture and literature ended up being repressed.67 As replacements Russian authorities chose
young communist activists from Ukraine and MASSR and ambitious workers who were
completely unfamiliar with the culture and national identity of Moldovans and in their majority

64

Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…, p.25.
Francis PaulWalters, A History of the League of Nations (London:Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. I,article 10,
p.48.
66
Terry Martin, “The Origins of Ethnic Cleansing” The Journal of Modern History, (Vol. 70, No. 4 December
1998), p.829.
67
Bruchis, The Republic of Moldova: From the Collapse of the Soviet Empire…, p.21.
65

21

did not even know the Moldovan language. The aggressive nationalist policy practiced on the
autochthons resulted in “severing the Moldovans form the east bank of the Dniester river” from
their own culture and transforming their language into “a Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian jargon”.68
The changes in Soviet policy included also the sudden decision of using the Latin alphabet in
literary Moldovan. The source of the “latinization decision” was rooted in the unbending Soviet
attempts to recapture Romanian Bessarabia. The Soviets this time wanted to emphasize “the
common bond between the language of the Moldovans of the MASSR and of the Moldovans on
the other side of the Dniestr” and to “increase the revolutionary influence of the Soviet Socialist
Moldova on the other side.”69
This Soviet policy directed at recapturing Bessarabia, on the domestic as well as
international front, soon brought an expected effect. Alongside with the outbreak of war, the
German and Russian governments automatically put into effect agreements included in the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in which Hitler acknowledged Russian claims to Bessarabia. On June,
1940 Stalin issued an ultimatum to the Romanian government demanding the immediate cession
of the region, including the northern portion of province of Bukovina.70 Taking under
consideration the fate of Poland, Romania reluctantly agreed to withdraw, but by no means accept
this loss of territory. In October 1940, the German troops entered Romania and several months
later Romania became an German ally and when the Soviet-German war broke out on June 22,
1941, the Romanian army immediately marched into occupied Bessarabia. 71

In a month

Romanian and German troops managed to free Bessarabia as well as Soviet Transnistria and then
reintegrate them into Romania. Yet Romanian rule, marked by the brutal anti-Jewish policy, did
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not last long In 1944 the course of war changed in favor of the Allied Powers, Transnistria again
came under Soviet control, and the Red Army advanced westward into the territory of Romanian
Bessarabia and southern Bukovina.72 Soon after the Russians demanded from the Romanian
government the restoration of the 1940 boundary, promising in exchange not to interfere in
internal Romanian domestic affairs.73 Bessarabia’s doom was sealed as the western powers
during the 1944 conferences eventually decided to give the Soviets a free hand in eastern
Europe. A 1947 treaty formally returned Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Transnistria to
Soviet Union.

4. Soviet policy vs. Native inhabitants. The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic
(MSSR), 1944-1989

The new communist republic that emerged from Russian annexation was “both more and
less than historic Bessarabia.”74 The newly created region was composed of six administrative
units of former Romanian Bessarabia and six eastern raions of Transnistria.75 According to the
demographic structure of the newly recaptured land, the Russians decided to incorporate into the
Ukrainian SSR the part of Transnistria with the Ukrainian majority as well as part of the counties
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of Hotin in northern Bessarabia and Akkerman, and Ismail in southern Bessarabia.76 The
Transnistria areas included in the MSSR, on the other hand, were those with the largest group of
native Moldovans as they composed almost half of the entire population. However, Charles King
claims that there was an even more important rationale than the demographic in the
administrative changes undertaken by the Soviets. Namely, “the inclusion of Bessarabia’s Danube
and Black Sea frontage in the Ukrainian SSR placed these strategic assets in the hands of a
reliable Soviet Republic rather than leaving them under the control of the newly created entity
and the potential object of Romanian irredentism.”77 Regardless of the Soviet goals, the new
Moldovan Soviet republic was second smallest after Armenian SSR with the population 2.4
million and 33 700 square kilometers surface.
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Map 2. The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 1944-199178

With the restoration of Russian government in Bessarabia, the Stalin regimes policy was
to russify the population as soon as possible and annihilate any remaining ties between the MSSR
inhabitants and Romania.79 Leonid Brezhnev, first secretary of the MSSR Communist Party, at
the beginning of his term noted that “these remote raions lying along the Dniester had to break
through to socialism by the shortest possible path.”80 This declaration meant in practice the
implementation of total collectivization of agriculture in the first post-war years. The
government’s policies of requisitioning huge supplies of agriculture products despite poor
78
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harvests - induced a famine following the catastrophic drought of 1945-47.81 There are some
evidence that the famine of 1946 – 50 was not the tragic consequence of cumulating factors collectivization, drought and mass deportation - but rather the purposeful operation of the Soviets
aimed at rural Moldovans ill-disposed toward new regime.

82

But the tragic outcome of

collectivization did not stop the Soviets away from conducting further repressive polices against
Moldovan peasants. During the years 1947-51 the Soviets also carried out a massive deportation
campaign which in all resulted in the deportation of 16,000 Moldovans peasant families. For
example, in only two days, July 6-7, 1949 over 11,000 Bessarabian families were targeted for
deportation to Kurgan, Tiumen, Irkutsk, and other destinations in Siberia and Kazakhstan in the
plan “Operation South”.83
Along with collectivization the Soviets decided to change the structure of the MSSR
Communist Party in order to create a support group for themselves among native people. Hence,
in 1949 over 50% of newly selected members of the Party were Moldovans. Thus, the Soviets
created the illusion that Moldovans themselves had the right to decide on the fate of republic
through the Soviet institution. The years right after the annexation were also marked by Soviet
striving to impose the “Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian jargon”, used already on the left bank of the
Dniester, upon the Bessarabian Moldovans.84 Immediately after taking over Bessarabia, Soviet
authorities ordered the publication of all the school textbooks, newspapers and works of fiction in
this jargon, using the Cyrillic alphabet. However this decision encountered the significant
opposition from Bessarabian society, especially prominent Moldovan writers. As most of those
writers were loyal communist activists agitating during the war in favor of the Soviets, the latter
81
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decided to step back from the harsh language policy. Not for long, however. During the entire
1950s the Soviets continued the constant reduction of the Moldovan language from public
administration as well as the systematic transformation of the latter’s conversational form into
Moldovan-Russian jargon.85
Stalin’s death in 1953 and the Khrushchev’s policy surprisingly did not weaken the
sovietisation process in Moldovan republic. The domination of the Russian language in the
public sphere, the massive Slavic migration into the Moldovan territory as well as the constant
deportation of the native inhabitants to Central Asia and Siberia continued and in the long – term
resulted in the further “demoldovianization” of the republic. It was especially visible in the
demographic data of that time. For example, Moldovan constituted some 68 percent of the
population in 1941, but only 63.9 percent by the 1978 census. Ukrainians, on the other hand, rose
from 11.1 percent in 1941 to 13.8 percent in 1989. The Russians population doubled within those
years.

86

The natural consequence of those demographic changes as well as the Moscow’s desire

to widen the control over Soviet territories was the disproportionate presence of Slavs in every
sphere of public life.87 Moreover, the Communist Party that was supposed to represent the entire
population of the republic was dominated by Ukrainians and Russians while Moldovans were
holding the least important offices. Similar domination appeared in the cultural life as well. The
cultural and scientific urban centers were developed by non-Moldovans, especially Russians, and
thus the high culture of the republic quickly became fully russified. The culture of Moldovans
was developed only in the rural area, the only area where Moldovans reminded a majority.
Therefore the Bessarabian culture was limited to the folklore and the folk art and “for many years
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shared nothing in common with the superimposed [Soviet] culture.”88 A Similar situation was
noted in academia. In over 60 research centers all over Moldavia that employed altogether over 6,
000 scientific workers only around 25 percent of them were ethnic Moldovans.89 Additionally, all
the publications and the newspapers were either published by non-Moldovans or subjected to the
Soviet editing.
This situation raised remarkable resentment among the native population that was tired of
the constant indoctrination and control. On one hand, Bessarabians, who were struggling to
preserve their own language and culture for almost 30 years after the Second World War, started
to understand that they cannot really expect any shift of Russian policy. Thus, tired of struggling
with the Russian authorities, they were ready to give up their own national identity and to became
well-integrated subjects of the Soviet system. But, on the other hand, the tragic condition of the
Union’s economy, uncertain political situation and the common atmosphere of resignation gave
the oppressed nation one more reason to fight for its rights. As Nicholas Dima rightly puts it, “In
their desperation, some of the more advanced Soviet nationalities, motivated by the concern for
survival, begun to reassert their national rights without any fear.”90
The beginning of 1980’s was marked by the Moldovan national awakening, as the new
generation of Moldovan activists and intellectuals became very active on the political scene.
During that time the language question became central to the national movement. Moldovan
politicians demanded the introduction of the Moldovan language in the public institutions,
including schools. Bessarabian cultural and academic elites were also pressing for the transition
to the Latin alphabet and the recognition of the a Moldovan-Romanian languages’ union. But the
Moldovan leaders radically shifted their demands when in September 1983 the enormous
88
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environmental disaster in Lvov took place. More that a billion gallons of salts form fertilizers
spilled into the Dniest river and contaminated the source of water for every major Moldovan city
and killed wildlife along the river.91

The Moldovan activists in the Communist Party

immediately demanded an investigation and raised accusations against the conservative
communist leaders whom they held responsible for the incident.
The repercussions of the Dniestr disaster coincided with a radical change of the Soviet
policy - the political movement of pierestroika and glasnost’ founded by the First Secretary of the
Communist Party, Michail Gorbachev. The policy of “openness” and economic reconstruction
commenced the transformation of the rusty Soviet system and inspired the major changes in the
politics of the Union’s republics.

92

This movement, in turn, inspired tens of thousands of native

Bessarabians to express their discontent with the local authorities and commence the extensive
public debate regarding the national identity of Moldovans. Thus, from denouncing the
ecological disaster of the Dniestr, “Moldovans moved toward claiming their cultural rights, and
then, toward demanding the creation of the independent Moldovan government.”93
However, the First Secretary of the Moldovan Party, Semion Grossu, successfully
managed to slow down the pace of political transformations, as he was not interested in reforms
that would remove the old, Stalinist-style cadre from the office. Yet, assistance for the Moldovan
national movement came surprisingly from Moscow. During the 19th conference of Soviet
Communists Gorbachev announced the new program of the revolutionary reforms that included
“the multicandidate elections, the retreat from the party’s dominance in the economy, and the
greater sensitivity to the nationalities question.”94 The Soviet policy shift was further confirmed
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in the articles published by the Moldovan Konsomol Congres that set up the introduction of the
new language and social reforms. This, in turn, gave an impulse for to establishment of the
Moldovan quasi- political organizations with the most prominent among them being: Moldovan
Movement in Support of Reconstructing and the Alexei Mateevici Literary-Musical Club.95 The
founding fathers of those organizations, Bessarabian journalists and political activists, stressed
the need to change the status of the Moldovan language and they demanded the recognition of the
identity of Moldovans. Most importantly however, they called for the transformation of Soviet
Union into a federation of independent states, which can be seen as the first step toward the
Moldovan sovereignty.
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After officially announcing those demands to the Soviet authorities,

Moldovan organizations held in Chisinau massive public demonstrations in support for the
Moldovan national movement. Later, in the mid-1989 the meeting of the political activists of all
Moldovan organizations took place. They agreed upon the foundation of the Moldovan Popular
Front - the first Moldovan National Party.97 Under the pressure from both, Gorbachev’s
government in Moscow and the Moldovan nationalists, Grossu eventually agreed upon legalizing
the Moldovan party. “It was the end of the communist monopoly of power” and the beginning of
the Moldovan path toward the independence from the Soviet state. 98
The almost two centuries of the harsh policy of russification influenced the Moldovan's
perception of the Russian authorities. The suppression of every aspect of the Moldovan social life
and the radical shift in 1937 away from the nation-building policy that was started after the First
World War significantly strengthened the local population’s reluctance towards the Soviets. The
native inhabitants of one of the best integrated republics into the Soviet system suddenly started
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to look for the answers regarding their national identity. Taking advantage of the crisis in the
Soviet Union in the 1980’s, Moldovans decided to take an active part in the political life of their
motherland. The reconstruction period brought the first divisions of the Soviet society between
the advocates of the perestroika- Moldovans, and its adversaries- non-Moldovans, mostly
Russians and Ukrainians. Thus, Bessarabians stopped viewing the interest pursued by the Soviet
Union as their own and started to look for political assistance in neighboring Romania and
Western European countries. As Davide Zaffi rightly puts it, “One seems justified in asserting
that the way Moldovans acted or reacted both in the international context and in internal affairs
[after the proclamation of independence] was determined or largely influenced by the attitude
they successively took towards Russia.”99
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Chapter II
The Establishment of the Political and Economic
Co-operation. 1989 – 1999

1. On the Path to Independence. 1989-1991

Although the government of Moldova Did not declare the full independence before
August 1991, it began the path to independence from the USSR already two years earlier. As
Charles King puts it, one could call the years between 1989 and 1991 “the crusade for rectifying
and appropriating the Moldovans’ genuine national identity after a half century of Soviet rule.”
100

Accordingly on August 31, 1989, the MSSR Supreme Soviet adopted the „Language Act“ that

declared Moldovan the state language of the republic , it “mandated the transition to Latin
alphabet, implicitly recognized the unity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages, and set out
the broad program for extending the use of Moldovan in government, education, and the national
economy.“101 In this way the Soviet Republic of Moldova became the first of the Union’s entities
that established the language of native inhabitants as the first official language. According to
Daria Fane, the American political scientist, this new legislation proved to be a turning point in
republic’s politics and caused the rise of nationalism among both Moldovans and those ethnic
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minorities who opposed the legislation, especially Russians.102
The question of minorities was in Moldova especially significant, as the republic had a
large non-Moldovan minority - 35,7% all in all, with the largest group being Ukrainian (584 196,
13,8%) and Russian (540 900, 13%).103The rapid development of Moldovan nationalism,
mirrored in the introduction of the new language Act, triggered harsh responses from the
Russian-speaking minority in the Transnistrian region as well as from the Gagauz minority in the
southern part of the republic. The question of minorities in Moldova was especially significant, as
the republic had a large non-Moldovan minority population – 35.7% in all, with the largest group
being Ukrainian (584 196, 13.8%) and Russian (540,900, 13%).104
Table 1. Largest minority groups in Moldova, 1989 and 2004105
Groups

Number

of Number

persons

persons

In 1989

2004

of %

share

in total
population

of %

share

of

in population

in

total

1989

2004

Ukrainians

600 000

283 367

13.8

8.4

Russians

562 000

198 144

13

5.8

Gagauz

157 500

147 661

3.5

4.4

Bulgarians

90000

65 072

2

1.9

Other

121 500

44 350

2.7

1.3
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Immediately after the introduction of a new language law ethnic minorities started to form
their own national organizations, equivalent to Moldovan Popular Front. For example, several
Transnistrian workers’ collectives led by Igor Smirnof, a Russian factory manager who came to
Moldova in November 1987, “united under the single banner of the Union of Workers Collectives
(OSTK) and pursued a policy of secession from Moldova.”106 Moreover, parallel to the
establishment of OSTK, a Slavic militant group emerged from the organization Edinstvo, famous
among the Soviet republics for its opposition to the reforms of the 1980s. The vehement
nationalist movements of the minority groups were an answer to the progressing
Moldovanization of the public life. Along with the removal of Russian as the dominant language,
Moldovan authorities began closing the Russian schools and started to favor Moldovan nationals
in the public administration. This course of events created fears among ethnic groups in Moldova
of losing their national identity, social status and economic sovereignty. 107 The slogans of the
Popular Front regarding the unification with Romania, which became more popular day by day,
only added insult to injury. As the summer of 1989 progressed, leaders of the Transnistria and
Gagauz regions initiated massive strikes in enterprises in all cities with large Russian-speaking
populations such as Tiraspol, Bender and Ribnita.108 Simultaneously, the emerging Russian
minority’s nationalist movement began to lobby Soviet authorities. It is worth noticing that the
leadership of the Russian minority movement was largely made up of the Russian functionaries
who had been dispatched to the Moldova Republic during the Gorbachev era.109 According to the
International Crisis Group’s report most of them were conservative communists who opposed the
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reform policy of Mikhail Gorbachev and by leading the national movement of Russian- speakers
in Moldova, wanted to keep the republic within the Soviet Union and to maintain their privileged
position.110
As a result of those developments Moscow’s authorities decided to support Transnistria’s
striving for separation from Moldova. This process had been accelerated by the Moldova’s
Supreme Soviet’s decision to declare autonomy within the Soviet Union in July 1990. A two
months later the Moldovan parliament, now called Sfatul Tarii, appointed as head of a state, the
leader of Popular Front Mircea Snegur who was reluctant to any kind of dependence on Moscow
and was a proponent of the reorientation toward Romania. As in consequence, tensions between
the Kishinev and Moscow deepened. On September 2, 1990, the Soviet Interior Ministry
mobilized troops to protect the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Transnistrian region
from the “Moldovan nationalists” as it proclaimed the Dniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist
Republic within the USSR, also known as DMR.111 Soon after the announcement non-Moldovan
separatists along with the Soviet representatives commenced in taking local control over the
major institutions and state administration. Moreover, KGB representatives and various Soviet
ministries began to meet in regular sessions to discuss the future strategies, including military
intervention and attitude toward the Moldovan government.112 Soviet leaders, in the face of
growing nationalism in Kishinev, decided to sabotage Moldava’s unification with Romania by
threatening it with territorial disintegration.
In spite of ongoing tensions between Moscow and Kishinev regarding the Transnistia
question, the slow agony of the disintegrating Soviet Empire pushed the two republics to attempt
110
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on September 22, 1990 to establish diplomatic relations. Leaders of both republics met in
Moscow and signed the Moldovan- Russian Treaty of Partnership that constituted the interstate
relations between the Socialist Republic of Moldova and the Soviet Socialist Federal Republic of
Russia.113 For the Moldovan side this agreement was a first signal that the Russians might
eventually accept the sovereignty of Moldova. However, for the Russians it was rather an attempt
to maintain Bessarabia within the Soviet Union and to suppress the Moldovan independence
movement. Eventually both of the Supreme Soviets in Moscow and Kishinev failed to ratify the
Treaty and official diplomatic relations were not established until five years later.
Meanwhile minority leaders headed by Igor Smirnof, soon the first president of
Dniestrian Republic, made moves to create their own governmental structure. They started to
form their own ministries and took over all the buildings housing the Moldovan state institutions.
Consequently over the next several months skirmishes between the central government troops
and the armed separatists escalated, culminating in an prolonged fighting outside the city of
Dubosari on November 2, 1990, between Moldovan police on one side and armed irregulars
supported by the separatists on the other.114 In face of these events Mircea Snegur asked Mikhail
Gorbachev to put an end to the secessionist conflict. 115 In return he offered to accept the Russian
proposal of “Union of Sovereign States” which meant the reorganization of the Soviet Union into
a new confederative body. However, Gorbatchev did not take the offer and instead on November
25 he sent the troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry in order to protect the planned elections for
the Supreme Soviet of the breakaway DMR.116 President Snegur, in turn, officially decided to
fulfill the main goal of the Moldovan Popular Front and to proclaim independence from Moscow.
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In order to do so, already at the end of the year he commenced with the formation of the
government of an independent state with the prime objective to preserve its territorial integrity.117
It is worth noticing that the “Snegur Plan” provided special policy toward ethnic groups that
would enable them to easily adapt to the new political system. For example, the Radio Free
Europe news read that the new government of Bessarabia was going to promote “a revival of the
Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian languages and cultures in Moldova, long subject to
russiafication, and to encouraging (sic) Russians to renounce Soviet ideology in favor of Russian
cultural traditions.”118
As a result of the growing disagreements between Moscow and Kishinev the latter
boycotted the all-Union referendum on March 17 concerning the future membership in the
proposed successor state of the USSR. Voting took place only in Transnistria where “the vote was
supposedly 93% in favor of the unitary Soviet state.”119 Simultaneously, the presidential elections
were held in the breakaway region where Igor Smirnof, the head of the radical communist camp,
had been elected.
In the first half of 1991 the situation in Moldova and its separatist region of Transnistia
was rather stable.120 Occasional clashes between Russian supported rebels and Moldovan troops
appeared in the cities of Bender and Dubosari but they were considered more as fights between
local hooligans than regular armed conflict. Transnistrian authorities with Soviet representatives
focused on dissolving the Moldovan financial, administrative and military institutions and
creating Dniestrian ones instead. In April the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the KGB
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directors and Russian ministries discussed the plausible dissolution of Moldovan law
enforcement bodies and as a result a month later all of them were put under Transnistian
jurisdiction and the local police and judiciary branches were established.121 Moreover, the
Russian Agroprombank created the first branch of the National Bank of Transnistria in which the
local enterprises opened accounts forming the first state budget.122Finally, the 14th Soviet army,
stationed in the region, as yet unofficially supporting the rebels in skirmishes with the Moldovan
government, began to provide direct military aid to the insurgency, supplying it with the weapons
indispensable for fighting with central government. At the same time Moldova became virtually
cut off from the rest of the Soviet Empire. ”The major rail and road links to Ukraine and beyond
run through the east-bank city of Rybnita, Dubasari, and Tiraspol, all of whose local councils had
declared their allegiance to the Transnistrian republic.”123 In response, in March the Moldovan
authorities issued protest notes to Supreme Soviet and Russian defense ministry complaining
about the army’s assistance to the rebels.
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It noted, inter alia, that the soldiers of Soviet 14th

army helped to form the new DMR army and the Dniestr Guards that was commanded by the
high ranking officers of the Russian army.
The events of August 19-21 involving the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Gorbatchev
proved to be a turning point in Russian- Moldovan relations as well as for the future course of the
Transnistrian conflict. 125 The August putsch, as the overthrown was later called, had its roots in
the ever weakening position of the communist party within the Soviet state and in the process of
gaining power by the new liberal political leadership advocating the disintegration of the current
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the Soviet state. Many of the hardline communists strongly opposed all of the new reforms,
especially the project of the “Union of Sovereign States” proposed by Gorbatchev, which would
have given more power to the republics’ governments and consequently weakened the position of
the “ruling class” in the Kremlin. In order to prevent the new reforms and save their power
credentials, “part of the top-level party and state administration members tried to take the power
in their hands … and to restore the former, pre-1985 situation in the USSR, that is to eliminate
multi-party system, commercial structures, in destroying the rudiments of democracy.”126
Fortunately, the putsch was organized very poorly and neither population nor army supported the
use of force against the legitimate power and the citizens who defend it. 127
The August coup emphasized the significant differences between Moldova and
Transnistria as the reactions of the regional authorities to the putsch were completely different.
In Kishinev, for example, the Moldovan Communist Party leaders headed by Grigore Eremei and
the Popular Front led by Mircea Snegur sided against the putsch organizers. In Transnistria, on
the other hand, Igor Smirnof “publically praised the putschists as saviors of the Soviet state and
promised military assistance to support the state of emergency.”128 Transnistria’s attachment to
hardline communism attracted unreformed communists from other Soviet republics and after the
coup some of them, like Vladimir Shevtsov, took high offices in the breakaway republic.129
Most importantly, the unsuccessful putsch and the defeat of the camp that wanted to
preserve the USSR hastened Moldova’s independence decision. On August 27, 1991, Alexander
Mosanu, president of the Moldovan parliament, proclaimed Moldova’s independence from the
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Soviet state and took control over Soviet assets on the Moldovan territory. 130 This declaration
“invoked historical rights and democratic legitimacy as the basis for statehood“ and called the
world’s states for recognition of independent Moldova and establishment of diplomatic relations
with the country.131 Moreover, the government of the newly independent state immediately
passed a series of resolutions regarding the formation of the central and local state institutions
that would take over all of the responsibilities performed until then by the Soviet authorities. In
addition, the parliament “passed a decree rescinding all articles in the republic’s constitution that
related to Moldova’s membership in the Soviet Union”. A special delegation was also sent to
Moscow in order to discuss the matters regarding the succession from USSR.

132

They agreed,

for instance, that Moldovan government would take over all the enterprises belonging to the
Soviets, including the heavy-industry factories on the territory of DMR (later confirmed in the
parliament’s decree no. 234 on November 14, 1991).133 Several days after the declaration Snegur
along with most notable Moldovan politicians, commenced negotiations with government in
Bucharest regarding the eventual reunification of the country with Romania.
The news about the possible unification with Bucharest raised panic among the Dniestrian
officials. The critical moment came when Kishinev targeted the leaders of the separatist
movement, including Igor Smirnof, arrested them and charged them with supporting the illegal
Moscow coup.134 In response the DMR threatened the Moldovan government with cutting the
gas and electricity supplies as well as blocking the rail lines leading west of the river.135 Once the
leaders were released on September 2, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria adopted its own
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constitution, officially proclaimed its independence from Moldova and announced its
incorporation into the Soviet Union. Smirnof later explained this decision by arguing that this
declaration was necessary to protect the Russian and Ukrainian minorities in the DMR from the
possible reunification of Moldova with Romania.136 Taking into account the violent conflict
between Russians and Romanians in the region, Transnistrians with reasons felt they might be
oppressed under Romanian rule. 137
In regards to the Soviet Union itself, after the victory of Yeltsin camp it was obvious that
the Union would dissolve sooner or later. After the coup attempt the fear that the Gorbachev’s
reforms would be withdrawn pushed the Soviet republics to quickly declare independence from
the Union. Consequently on December 8, 1991, the representatives from Moscow along with
leaders from Belarus and Ukraine signed an agreement dissolving the Union and establishing the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) instead an entity in which Moldova would
eventually take an active part.138

2. The Relations between Sovereign States.
The Transnistrian Conflict

Even though the Soviet empire had collapsed Russian authorities still wanted to maintain
their grip on former Soviet republics, including Moldova and Transnistira, through the CIS
organization. On the other hand the newly born states wanted to assure their sovereignty and
136
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were very cautious about joining an organization dominated by the Russians. Nevertheless, they
were drawn to the organization by economic necessity.139 Moreover, in case of Moldova the
threat that Russia might get involved in the ethnic conflict within the Moldavan state, if Kishiniev
refused to join CIS, was an additional factor that compelled the country to apply for a
membership.
Still hoping to avoid Russian influence, at the beginning of the negotiations in Moscow
in December 1991, president Snegur strongly opposed the formation of CIS, seeing it as a
different form of the Russian control similar to that of the Soviet Union. On December 8, 1991,
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) quoted the president who said that “with every
passing day, … the desire of certain state leaders to return to the organization of the former USSR
is becoming increasingly apparent… .”140 Nevertheless, the broken economic ties between the
Soviet entities had serious repercussions on people’s living conditions, which in turn made the
political situation in Moldova unstable and forced Snegur to plead for economic cooperation with
CIS states.141 After the collapse of the Soviet Union Moldova relied almost exclusively on the
former Soviet republics for raw materials and fuel.142 Although it tried to find new economic
partners outside the post-Soviet world, it was highly difficult as foreign countries conditioned
their cooperation with the Former Soviet Republics on the Russians’ reaction. For example, in
1992 the only countries that established economic relations with Moldova were, obviously,
Romania, Bulgaria, Kuwait, the United States and Israel.
The main sticking point between Moldovan authorities and the CIS was the military
cooperation clause that included the prohibition of maintaining countries’ own arm forces and the
139
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establishment of joint military command structures (which meant in practice agreeing to CIS
army’s presence in the member states). For Moldovans this reservation meant that they agreed to
the presence of 14th army that had provided assistance to the insurgents in fighting with
Moldovan troops in Transnistira. Moreover, even though the statutes of CIS forbade the
interference into the domestic affairs of any member state, every member had the right to engage
in ”measures that aim at the suppression of the danger that might occur in respect to the
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of a member state of the commonwealth.”

143

This

meant in practice that the Russian army, for example, could enter the territory of Moldovan
republic every time they assumed the security or sovereignty of the state was in danger. However,
unlike the previous union CIS, did not possess the supranational prerogatives that would allow
the organization to constantly interfere in the domestic policy of constituent states and was more
focused on the intensification of interstate cooperation.144
In the middle of December 1991 Moldova signed the CIS chapter (also called the AlmaAta Protocol) that established the Commonwealth of Independent States with the reservation that
Moldova would not enter the structures of military cooperation within the organization.

145

This

decision strongly influenced the later Russian-Moldovan relations as Moscow repeatedly tied the
withdrawal of the 14th army to Moldova’s participation in some type of security arrangement with
Russia.146
Meanwhile, the new Russian authorities with reformist Boris Yeltsin as a head of the state
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faced the challenge of creating a new foreign policy toward “the Near Abroad”. 147 So far, the
directions of policy were indicated by communist ideology so when the Soviet Union dissolved
Russia’s first priority became to define the national interest that would, in turn, determine the
foreign policy of the state.148 To define the national interest it was necessary to decide who
belongs to the Russian nation. The question was whether the Russian nation meant all the
Russian speakers, including those who lived outside the Federation, or should it be confined only
to people of the Russian descent. The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs led by Andrei Kozyrev ,
which was responsible for determining the policy guidelines, was still in the hands of the “hard
liners” who wanted to maintain Russian power over the former Soviet republics. Respectively,
the Ministry quickly figured that if the main goal of the foreign policy would be to protect the
Russian-speaking people living in post-Soviet states, the Russian government would have an easy
excuse to intervene in the post-Soviet space. In February 1992, for example, Kozyrev stated that
“while Russia respected the sovereignty of the newly-formed states Russia would strictly defend
its own interests…including not only economic ties but preservation of a unified army…and the
protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in other CIS states.”149
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3. Russian Involvement in the Transnistrian War

Taking under consideration the Russians’ new foreign policy approach it is easy to
conjecture their attitude toward the Transnistrian conflict and the independent Republic of
Moldova itself. The majority of the diplomatic relations between the end of 1992 and 1999
revolved around Russian involvement in the Dnister conflict and finding a solution to this
problem that would satisfy all three sides.
In early 1992, as the conflict between the secessionists and the Moldovan troops
intensified the newly elected president of Dniestrian republic Smirnof began a “campaign of
harassment” to throw all “pro-Moldovan elements” out of the separatist republic.150 To be able to
implement this plan the government in Tiraspol asked Moscow for support. In response, Kremlin,
sent hundreds of mercenaries, Cossacks and other military personnel to the Dniester region
through the Ukrainian border.151 “The Cossacks and other volunteers were put on the Russian
state payroll, receiving 3000 rubles a month.”152 Moreover, some sources reported that the
separatist government was granted several million rubles in aid to support its military activists by
the authorities in Moscow.153
The major element of the Russian involvement in the conflict in Moldova was the Soviet
14th army stationed on the left bank of the Dniester river. When the government in Kishinev did
not agree to join the military structure of CIS and demanded to be given control over all Soviet

150

Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist …, p.19.
Smith , Russia and Moldova: Developing Relations…, p.40.
152
Kolso, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism…, p.987.
153
David Neuman, Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity (London: Routledge Studies in Geopolitics, 1991),
p.72.
151

45

army forces and equipment located in Moldova Russians rejected those demands. 154 However,
seeing that the presence of army in Transnistria was a great bargaining chip in the shaping of
Moldova-Russia relations they left the status of the 14th army to further negotiations. A couple of
weeks later “the commanding general of 14th Army, Lieutenant General Gennadii Yakovlev,
accepted the position of Chief of Defense for the Dniester Republic and placed the 14 th Army
troops and equipment at the disposal of the government.”155 Consequently at the beginning of the
year, the 14th army occupied Grigoriopol, Dubosari Tiraspol and Ribnita so that Moldovan troops
could not enter the cities and prevent the planed secession. 156
The skirmishes escalated into outright war in March, just after Moldova’s accession to the
United Nations on March 2, 1993. Transnistrian forces led by the high-ranking Russian officers,
along with 14th Army’s soldiers, attacked police offices in Bandera and Dubosari. The Moldovan
army was not able to take control over the cities. The fighting lasted for a couple of weeks and
resulted in approximately 1000 deaths, while 130,000 people were either internally displaced or
sought refuge in other countries.157 This course of events was a shock for Moldovan authorities.
They immediately protested to the CIS organs calling for the CIS military to intervene in the
conflict as peacekeepers along with United Nations peacekeeping mission.158 However, as Russia
had a dominant position in the organization and used it rather as an instrument of influencing the
policy of the former Soviet republics, CIS did not meet Kishinev’s demands. Additionally, at the
Helsinki Foreign Ministers Conference, Kishinev, along with the Romanian representatives,
protested the activities of the separatist troops as well as the obvious Russian support of the
insurgents. In response to their call Boris Yeltsin signed the decree which placed the 14 th Army
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under the Yeltsin’s personal command, what made it impossible for Moldova to take over the
command of the 14th Army.

159

One of the Army’s Commanders, Jevgenii Nietkachov proposed

that the 14th Army would become the peacekeeping force. This was ridiculous, taking into
consideration the role the Army had played in the conflict so far.
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In Moscow Vice-President

Aleksander Rutskoi openly supported the Transnistrian separatist movement, called the Russian
Congress of Peoples Deputies to recognize Dnistrian sovereignty and to support the
Transnistrians in their conflict with the

Moldovan government. The Russian Congress of

People’s Deputies applied those instructions on April 8 , 1993.161 A month later Rutskoy visited
the breakaway region and gave a speech in which he emphasized the responsibility of the Russian
authorities to protect the 25 million Russians who were living outside Russia’s borders and
promised to

intensify the Russian support if needed. Rafał Morawiec, the specialist on

Moldova’s politics from the Polish Academy of Science, pointedly called Russian policy toward
Moldova and Transnistria as an new “Brezhnev Doctrine.” 162
But not everyone in the Kremlin supported this radical stand on the Dniestrian conflict.
Both major foreign policy representatives, Boris Yeltsin and Minister Kozyrev called for
Moldovan territorial integrity and commenced peace negotiations.

163

In order to gain more

control over Russian forces stationed in the region Yeltsin decided to replace the previous
Commander-In-Chief with the Major General Alexander Lebed, the battalion Commander in the
Soviet war in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it appeared that Lebed not only less subordinate than
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the previous Commander but was also a hardline communist and the biggest opponent of the
reformist policy of Yeltsin. While performing his duties Lebed very often provoked the Moldovan
government by calling its leaders “Moldovan Fasists”. He also said that President Mircea Snegur
was “negotiating with Yeltsin only in order to mislead public opinion, while in reality (he was)
preparing for war.”164 Increasingly unauthorized actions of individual 14th Army units were
reported in the summer 1992 in what was perceived as if the Kremlin was losing complete
control over the Russian forces. “Orders were not executed, individual units broke away and
solders, paid more by the separatists than by the Russian state, entered into their militia.”165

4. The Peace negotiations

In response to losing control over developments in Transnistria Yeltsin decided to
intervene to halt the conflict in July 1992. The decision was driven mostly by Yeltsin’s desire to
stabilize the domestic conflict in Russia where his reforms came under attack by the hardline
communist camp and extreme nationalists. For instance, the Congress of People’s Deputies - the
supreme organ of power in the Federation dominated by Yeltsin opponents, was systematically
reducing presidential powers, including the power of appointing of administrative offices.166
Thus, in order to please the opposition Yeltsin decided to commence the peace
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negotiations with Moldova that would eventually result in the proclamation of independence of
the breakaway Transnistrian territory. Kishinev had proposed quadripartite talks with assistance
from the Ukrainian and Romanian governments but the Russian side disagreed saying that the
most effective negotiations would be between the Russian and Moldovan authorities. After a
couple of days of negotiations, on 21, July the sides reached the solution that included: “
Implementing a cease-fire, creating a demarcation corridor between the forces, introducing the
neutral peacekeeping forces, granting a political status to the left bank of the Dniester by the
Moldovan parliament and ultimately scheduling the bilateral negotiations on withdrawing the 14th
Army.”167 Russian representatives also promised to restore trade between the two countries that
had been suspended by the Federation after the Moldovan declaration of independence.
During the implementation of the peace arrangements the most difficult part was the
establishment of the peacekeeping forces. Kishinev insisted that the mission be made up of CIS
and UN troops while Moscow preferred the peacekeeping forces to be constituted out of the
Russian forces, meaning the 14th Army and only eventually Moldovan and Transnistrian soldiers.
168

Russian agreed not to engage the 14th Army in the peacekeeping mission but instead to send

some additional Russian troops to the region. Moldova agreed to this scenario and in mid-July
the peacekeeping mission that was composed of 3800 Russian, 1200 Moldovan and 1200
Dniester solders was sent to the left bank.169 The Moldovan decision was very controversial. By
agreeing to accept additional Russian troops as peacekeepers on its territory in practice the
Moldovan government agreed to enlarge the Russian contingent stationed in the region and thus
allowed the Russians to increase their control over the course of events in Transnistria. Later,
during an interview President Snegur stated that sending Russian troops was the only chance to
167
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form the peacekeeping mission because the UN organs did not agree to send troops to the region
while the conflict was still ongoing. 170
A couple of days after the deployment of the peacekeeping mission to the region the first
complaints about its activities appeared. The Moldovan president asked the UN to send
international observers because of “the rising doubts about the other side’s sincerity.”

171

The

President claimed, for instance, that the peacekeeping forces allowed the formation of the
independent institutions of the Transnistrian government and thus strengthened the secessionist
movement. The promised negotiation regarding the withdrawal of 14th Army also did not bring
the expected results. Every time the Moldovan foreign Minister wanted to commence the talks
the Russian authorities postponed them. Finally Minister Kozyrev officially stated that the
withdrawal of the Russian forces would only be possible when Moldova considered military
cooperation within the CIS military structure. 172 To sum up, after the negotiation Moldova ended
up having 3800 more Russian soldiers on its soil and the fully formed institutions of the
secessionist government thanks to the deployed international peacekeeping mission. This
situation definitely did not satisfy the Moldovan authorities. The Russian intervention into the
conflict and the continual pro-DMR rhetoric from the Russian Duma convinced many leaders that
the Russian Federation was intent on using the Transnistiran crisis as a way of exercising control
over Moldovan domestic affairs.”173
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5. Frozen Conflict174

“The result of the Russian intervention was that Transnistria became effectively
portioned form the rest of Moldova, the fighting cooled, and was replaced by a frozen
conflict.”175 Although the fighting between the troops almost stopped neither Russia and
Moldova nor Transnistria and Moldova reached any peace agreement. Moldova abandoned all
hopes concerning the rapid withdrawal of the 14th Army after the Russian Minister of Defense,
Pavel Grachev, stated “ the withdrawal of 14th Army from the Dniester area will only be possible
when the conflict in the region is settled.”176 In DMR, on the other hand, Smirnof’s advisor Valeri
Litskai (latter appointed the Foreign Minister) demanded the formation of a Federalist state
consisting of three entities: the Republic of Moldova, the Soviet Republic of Transnistria and the
Republic of Gagauz. President Snegur immediately rejected this proposal and stated that he
would oppose any kind of the transformation of Moldova into the federative structure. He also
added that he would oppose the creation of the sovereign Dniester state with its own army forces,
borders, and security services and might only agree on the creation of

Dniester autonomy

within the Moldovan state.177
In February 1993 the presidents Yeltsin and Snegur met in the Kremlin to discuss the most
burning questions in the relations between two countries. The meeting was considered to be the
third round of negotiations for withdrawal of the Russian troops. During the talks Snegur
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proposed the creation of a free trade zone in Bender, granting the DMR a special political status
within the state, and complying with international norms regarding the rights of minorities in the
country. Both Russia and Transnistrian leaders did not agree to this proposal and demanded the
formation of an independent Dniestrian army. Boris Yeltsin, when asked about the precise date of
withdrawal of the Russian Army from Transnistria, proposed that part of the contingent might be
disbanded, which would mean in practice the transfer of soldiers and their equipment to the
Transnistrian Guard. In face of the lack of any agreement Moldova started to seek a helping hand
in the adjacent neighborhood. On February 19, 1993 Moldova signed a Treaty with the Ukrainian
government on cooperation between the national custom services in order to reduce the transit of
goods to the DMR as well as to suppress the infiltration of the Russian mercenaries. In this way
Ukraine tried to implement the plan of creating the kind of regional alliance that would serve as
counterbalance to Russian domination.178
Moscow’s reaction was harsh as usual. Russia punished Ukraine for making deals
behind Russia’s back by voting on reclaiming Sevastopol as Russian territory. It also turned
against the government in Kishinev. Kremlin used trade barriers to make exports to Russia from
Moldova completely unprofitable. As sales to Russia and other CIS countries dominated the
Moldova economy, the financial stability of the country was completely dependent on the trade
relations with Russia. In this case the government in Kishinev did not have much of a choice. In
September, during the CIS countries meeting, both sides agreed that Moldova in return for lifting
the trade restrictions on January 1, 1994, would sign the Agreement of Creation of CIS and thus
became a full member of the organization without any restrictions.179 The Agreement entered into
force on April 8, 1994. Moreover Moldova signed the CIS Human Rights Convention as well as
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joined the economic cooperation board and the Committee of the Foreign Ministries CIS created
to coordinate the common foreign policy of the CIS countries.

180

When news about the Snegur’s

decision reached Kishinev protests broke out all over the century. The pro-Romanian and proEuropean camps stated that “Russia will use the economy to enslave Moldova politically and as
long as the occupational 14th Army stays in Moldova, we can make no arrangements with
Russia.”

181

Reporters of BASA-press informed that around 200 people protested on the

parliament square against Moldova’s entrance into CIS shouting slogans like “ The Parliament
wants us to have an economic, political, social and cultural Gulag.”182 Yet, the protests of the
Moldovan opposition were silenced for a while when in October the constitutional crisis in
Moscow engaged the Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities. The crisis broke out when Yeltsin
dissolved the main legislative body, the Congress of People’s Deputies, led by his mail opponent,
Ruslan Chasbulatov.

183

In response, the Russian parliament impeached Boris Yeltsin and

replaced him with the hardline communist, vice president Alexander Rutskoy. When on October
3, 1993 the Russian Army, obedient to the old president, stormed the parliament building the
DMR authorities came out against the Yeltsin leadership and promised armed support for
Chasbulatov and Rutskoy. Ten days later, after the arrests of the impeachment leaders, Yeltsin
decided to tackle the rebellious DMR leadership. “The Russian Central Bank froze Transnistrian
assets, stopped supplying rubles…and Defense Minister Grachev ordered the 14th Army,
commander, General Alexander Lebed, to sever relations with the criminal DMR government,
accusing its leadership of corruption and involvement in the illegal arms trade.”184 Although the
180
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Moldovan leadership considered it to be the turning point in the Russian-Moldovan relations
regarding the Transnistrian conflict, its happiness was premature. It proved to be a spontaneous
reaction of Yeltsin that was very quickly explained by Kozyrev who said that “the Transnistria’
leadership attitude toward constitutional crisis in Moscow had nothing to do with the protection
of the Russian national interests in the region.” 185

6. The Russian- Moldovan Relations: Warming Up?

In early 1994 the political climate in Kishinev had drastically changed. In February the
Agrarian Democratic Party won in the parliamentary elections getting the majority of the seats in
the parliament. This reformist communist organization backed the closer ties with the Russian
Federation and other former Republics and was, accordingly, against close cooperation with
Romania. Petru Lucinschi, Speaker of Moldovan Parliament, advocated Moldova’s entrance into
CIS structures and intensification of economic cooperation, including the Free Trade Zone within
the CIS territory. He was also a fervent proponent of the “proportional integration” which meant
the simultaneous integration of Moldova with European and CIS structure. 186 Lucinschi, on the
other hand, strongly opposed the presence of the foreign troops on the Moldovan territory.
Therefore, just after the elections, the Moldovan parliament adopted the neutrality clause (Article
11) of 1994 Moldovan constitution that made foreign military presence on the Moldovan territory
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illegal. 187
Further improvement of Russian-Moldovan relations occurred with the results of the
referendum on the future integration of the country with Romania. It turned out that the proRomanian and anti-state position of the Popular Front was backed only by the small minority of
population and over 95 percent of voters favored Moldova’s continuing independent statehood.188
Moldova’s full accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States softened Russia’s attitude
towards the demands of withdrawal of the 14th Army’s from the DMR. The shift in Russian
policy was also a result of pressure from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), which in July adopted a resolution disapproving Russian involvement the
conflict.189 After two years of negotiation during the OSCE Budapest Summit on October 24,
1994, Moldova and Russia signed the agreement that called for the Russian Army’s withdrawal
within three years from the date of the entry into force of the agreement. 190 Up to this moment the
Russians had linked the withdrawal of the troops to a settlement on the final status of
Transnistria. It was a first time when the Federation did not add any sine qua non condition to the
settlement. However, in view of the future NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space, at the
end of the year the Federation began to mention the maintenance of its forces in Moldova.

191

The

Russian Duma claimed “since the document was the international agreement on Russian military
forces, it needed to be ratified by the Russian parliament first.”192 The lower house, in turn, was
overwhelmingly dominated by the hard-liner communists led by Chasbulatov, who would never
agree on removing the Army without an agreement on the secession of DMR from the Republic
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of Moldova. When the protests from Kishinev resounded Russian officials renamed and
reorganized the 14th Army into “Operational Group of Russian Forces”(OGRF) and thus made
the agreement with Moldova invalid. Disappointed Moldovan leaders in a last-ditch attempt to
solve the Russian Army issue on November 24, 1994 ratified the new constitution. The Article
111 of the document officially gave special autonomy status to the Transnistrian region and
Gagauzia.

193

Thus Moldovans insisted that the removal of the Russian troops begin with the

granting of autonomy to the DMR but the Russian parliament claimed that the agreement would
come into force only after its ratification by the Congress of People’s Deputies.
Yet Moscow knew that the maintenance of the large military formations was not only very
costly, taking under consideration the current economic situation in the country, but also pointless
to some degree, since the DMR was of declining strategic value.194 Moreover at the beginning of
1995 the Transnistrian parliament passed the bill forbidding either withdrawing or decreasing the
number of Russian soldiers stationed in the region. The case of Russian decision to withdraw the
troops, all the assets including various kinds of equipment would be transferred to the DMR
leadership. 195 Tired of nursing the breakaway region which many times showed a lack of loyalty
to the presidential camp the Russian Defense Ministry Pavel Grachev issued a decree
significantly reducing the numbers of troops stationed in the DMR. Yet, a week later, on April 26,
1995, the Russian Duma passed a resolution forbidding the withdrawal of troops under the
pretext of the threat of another outbreak of war in Moldova. 196 In this instance Yeltsin decided to
outwit the opposition in the Russian legislature and appointed as new commander of the OGRF
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Valerii Yevnevich who replaced the rebellious general Lebed. Loyal to the reformist camp
Yevnevich quickly reduced the administrative personnel by over 45 percent and destroyed part of
the military stockpiles. But this gesture toward the Moldovan authorities did not mean that
Moscow accepted Kishenev’s conditions. In June, during the presidential meeting the head of the
Russian state offered assistance in resolving the “ Transnistrian problem” in return for promise of
establishing permanent Russian military bases in the country. 197 Yeltsin made similar offer to the
authorities of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia

198

. At this time, the Duma was not indifferent to

the presidential arrangements. On November 17, 1994 the Congress of People’s Deputies on the
initiative of radical communists and nationalists (especially Vladimir Zirinovsky) passed a
resolution proclaiming Moldova „a strategic sphere of Russian interests.“ This controversial
decision was an answer to Moldova’s accession to the Council of Europe on July 13, 1995 and
the “Partnership of Peace” which was a program of North Atlantic Treaty Organization aimed at
creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe.
The real shift in Russian foreign policy toward the “Near Abroad” came with the
replacement of Minister Kozyrev by the Yevgeny Primakov. Although the new Minister was a
proponent of protecting the Russian national interest in the region and strongly opposed NATO’s
expansion into the “ Near Abroad”, he was also an ardent supporter of using more diplomatic
methods to advance national security.199According to the International Crisis Group report,
Moscow “became less willing to bear the primary costs of CIS reintegration and pushed this to
occur at different speeds within core of willing states, including via the Custom Union (Russia,
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Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and later Tajikistan) and the Russian-Belarus Union.”200 The
warming-up in Russia-Moldovan relations was also rooted in the outcome of the presidential
elections in Moldova on November 31, 1996. In the second round of presidential elections the
current President Mircea Snegur was defeated by the former head of the Agrarian Democratic
Party and the speaker of Moldovan parliament, Petru Lucinschi. The newly elected President was
very well known for his pro-Russian views and immediately after his victory the analysts in
Moscow anticipated that “ Lucinschi's victory could pave the way for the settlement of a
secessionist rebellion by ethnic Russians in Moldova's industrial Dniester region.”201
Thus in the middle of the year the Russian Foreign Minister initiated quadripartite talks,
with the representatives of Russia, Moldova, OSCE and Ukraine, on the memorandum entitled “
Bases for Normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and DMR.”202 The very
short document, (only two pages long), contained almost all the previous arrangements regarding
the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Yet, the sides could not agree on the final
status of the breakaway region and the final draft of the agreement assumed that the parties
“continue the establishment between them of state-legal relations.”203 Although the
Normalization Act did not initiate the establishment of the new sovereign republic of Transnistria
it allowed it to have some attributes of an independent state. For, example, in accordance with the
Act Transnistria was able to conduct of its own foreign policy. Moreover the act introduced the
concept of “ common state” which suggested the formation of the Moldovan Confederation with
the independent entities within. Still performing his duties Snegur did not agree with the
interpretation of the Act and did not sign the memorandum. Later, during the presidential
200
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elections the matter of the Normalization Agreement became an important issue. The Communist
and pro-Russian candidate Lucinschi claimed that Snegur did not sign the Act because of the
pressure from the government in Bucharest that wanted to maintain the Transnistrian crisis as
long as possible to set Kishinev against the Russian authorities. His view on that matter was
confirmed during the Lucinschi’s October visit in Moscow. Through at that time only

a

presidential candidate, he pledged that during his presidency Moldovan-Russian relations would
be of highest priority.

204

However, after a couple of weeks it turned out that Snegur was not the

only one who did not eventually agree on the content of memorandum. Yeltsin in the face of the
upcoming presidential elections also did not support the arrangement included in the
Normalization Act. He wanted to please hardline communists and nationalists opposing any
concessions regarding status of the DMR and presence of the Russian troops in Moldova. 205
Russian-Moldovan cooperation over the next three years revolved around finding conflict
resolution. In the middle of 1997 newly elected President Lucinschi and the head of Transnistria
worked up a special annex to the 1996 memorandum that elaborated on all of the disputed
points.206 On May 8, 1996, the representatives of the breakaway region and Moldova signed in
Moscow the annex to the memorandum and the agreement itself under the auspices of Russian
and Ukrainian governments. With the signing of the Normalization Act, “newspapers and wire
services immediately reported that the Transnistrian conflict had been resolved.”207
Unfortunately, that was not entirely true. In reality the memorandum did not resolve any of the
most controversial issues. For example, the document did not resolve either the presence of
Russian troops or the final status of the province. Both sides were only obligated to continue the
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negotiations on a peaceful resolution within “ the structure of one consolidated state.”208
At the same time the Russian authorities noticed that Moldova had retired from active
participation in CIS activities, especially regarding military cooperation. Further Moscow was
alarmed by the news that post-Soviet countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova had
met in Strasbourg to discuss the foundation of a new Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development (GUAM).209 Although the official goal of establishing of organization was to find
“solutions for mainly two problems that were not tackled properly within the existing
organization where all four countries were members – in the CIS:(…) cooperation on regional
security and cooperation on energy”, GUAM was seen as a way of countering Moscow’s
influence in the region.210 Yeltsin not only worried that Russia would lose its dominant position
in the area but was mostly afraid of American influence over “ the Near Abroad” as the GUAM’s
founding was immediately supported by the United States government. In spite of the Russian
deputy foreign Minister assurances that “there is no anti-Russian factor” in GUAM, the Russian
president in order to improve Moldova Russia relations paid an unofficial visit to Kishinev.
Allegedly during that meeting Yeltsin made Lucinschi an offer that in return for a reassurance
that Moldova would not turn its back on Russia, the Kremlin might consider the withdrawal of
the Russian Army from Transnistria. Unfortunately, taking under consideration the fact that the
status of the Army did not change in any way, one can assume that presidents did not come to an
agreement.
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7. Economic Crisis

In 1998, as a consequence of the fast deteriorating economic situation in Russia, for the
first time the governments in Moscow and Kishinev focused more on the economic issues in
interstate relations than on resolving the Dniestrian deadlock. Trade between the countries had
been regulated by the agreements signed during the Soviet period and the only time it had been
disturbed was by the temporary export berriers imposed by Russians in order to influence the
Moldovan policy-making process.
Meanwhile, in Russia the economy suffered from declining productivity, an artificially
high fixed exchange rate between the ruble and foreign currencies, and an enormous fiscal
deficit.211 Consequently, at the beginning of the year, nflation reached 84 percent, the biggest
banks were being closed down and the government was forced to pay millions of rubles to settle
with striking miners. In turn, the on-going economic crisis in Russia greatly influenced the
already severe economic situation in Bessarabia. Since Moldova’s declaration of independence in
1991, Russia had been the main investor in Moldova and the main supplier of the most strategic
recourses like energy, oil, gas and other raw materials.212 Moreover, at that time, Russia
accounted for “around 40 percent of the Moldova’s export and till the outbreak of the crisis the
reciprocal trade was growing”.213
In the face of the growing economic crisis in March 1998 Russia decided to take
advantage of Moldova’s dependence on Russian resources and forced the weaker partner to sign
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the bilateral “Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation (RF) and the
Republic of Moldova” that was very unfavorable for Kishinev.

214

The agreement established the

framework for Russian-Moldovan trade relations for the next ten years and set gas prices on a
much higher level than the prices imposed on other post-Soviet states. For example, when
Moldova had to pay 80 dollars per cubic meters for imported gas from the Federation, Belarus
and Armenia paid only half of that. 215 Due to the ridiculously high prices for the gas provided by
the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, the republic’s energy debt to Russia amounted to some 215
million dollars, or roughly 11 percent of Moldova’s GDP.216 Kishinev’s inability to pay for the
gas deliveries forced Russia to halve the supply on July, 1, 1998. When Gazprom threatened a
complete cutoff in August Moldova “agreed to transfer to Gazprom 90 million dollars in
government bonds, with an annual interest rate of 7.5 percent, by the end of 1999.” 217 To be able
to pay off the Gazprom debt the Moldovan leadership decided to introduce the system of
“temporary power cuts” till the end of the year. This decision aroused much controversy among
the Moldovan populations, as around half of the Gazprom debt was DMR’s share. Yet, Kishinev
was reluctant to let Tiraspol accept responsibility for its share of the debt to Gazprom, “viewing
this as a further step in recognizing Transnistria’s sovereignty.”218
The economic turmoil in both countries did not obstruct moving to the next stage of the
Transnistrian conflict resolution. “With the active support of Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma Lucinschi and Smirnof concluded an
agreement in Odessa in March 1998 that called for a reduction in the number of peacekeeping
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forces and the re-building of the bridges that were destroyed or damaged during the fighting in
1992 and 1993.”219 Additionally, at this meeting the Russian Defense Minister, Igor Sergeev,
made the removal of the Russian troops one of the conditions to the accomplishment of a final
settlement of the Dniestrian conflict.
However, at the end of the decade, Russian-Moldovan relations significantly deteriorated.
Moldovan authorities expressed their dissatisfaction with the course of cooperation with Russia
during the CIS meeting by stating a willingness of resigning from membership in the
organization. At the same time it tried to develop closer relations with one of its neighbors Romania. In order to do so the representatives of both countries met in Bucharest to discuss the
extension of economic cooperation. There were two main reasons why Moldova stopped
considering Russia as its most important partner. First of all, Moldova was tired of the endless
talks and negotiations on withdrawal of Russian forces from DMR without any visible results.
Moldovan authorities eventually understood that this decision was being constantly postponed
only in order to retain decisive influence over the weaker country and did not really depend on
the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Secondly, the consequences of the Russian crisis
helped them to realize that the Moldovan economic situation was completely dependent on
Russia’s policy. Therefore, when Gazprom periodically reduced deliveries and threatened on
occasion to cut off supplies entirely the Moldovan leadership started to look for international
partners in the West.
The shift in the Moldovan attitude toward its major partner was also noticed by the
Russian authorities. Firstly Moscow attempted to threaten the leaders in Kishinev by adopting
the resolution in March proclaiming Transnistira “sphere of the Russian strategic interest.”220
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When this strategy did not bring the expected results, the Kremlin decided to implement the more
diplomatic “Plan B.” Namely , in November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul Russia
eventually agreed on a declaration to remove all the army forces from Moldovan Republic by the
end of 2002.

221

Yeltsin also stated that all categories of arms and equipment would not be

transferred to the Transnistrian Guard but were to be destroyed or withdrawn by the end of 2001.
It is important to note that, unlike the previous 1994 declaration on removal of the 14th Army, this
time the agreement was reached without any conditions and without any linkage to resolving
Transnistria’s status.222 Unfortunately that was the only difference between those two agreements.
Similarly to the previous declaration, the Istanbul settlement did not resolve the issue and as it
will be presented in the next chapter the presence of the Russian army would also be the main
issue in the Russian-Moldovan relations in the XXI century.
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the size of the Russian troops decreased
considerably, from 9250 in 1992 to 2600 in 1999. Also significant amount of military equipment
was destroyed.223 Moreover, under the new Commander Evnevich the forces played a more
conciliatory role and there was no more rhetoric about Moldovan fascists or orchestrated
genocide, as occurred under the command of General Lebied.
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According to Charles King,

these developments were consequence of Moscow’s growing dissatisfaction with tragic economic
situation in DMR and enormous Gazprom debt. Moreover, the Kremlin was unsatisfied with the
fact that Trasnistria seemed to be an creation that mostly served the economic interests of its
leaders.225 Not without effect was the strong support of the DMR leadership for the Yeltsin
opposition during the 1991 and 1993 coups in Moscow. Therefore at the end of the decade the
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Yeltsin leadership had little reason to associate itself with the Dniestrian authorities and
deteriorate the relation with Moldova by providing assistance to the rebellious region.
By the late 1990s the political atmosphere in Kishinev also changed, which brought a new
perspective to Russian-Moldovan relations in the XXI century. The Moldovan population was no
longer so optimistic about the formation of the new state and no one spoke about possible
reunification with Romania. Moreover the newly elected President Lucinschi was a very fervent
proponent of close cooperation with Federation and opposed any symptoms of nationalism in
Moldovan politics.
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All of this set up excellent conditions for the final resolution of

Transnistrian conflict and for intensifying cooperation with Russia.
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Chapter III
The Voronin Era. Moldovan-Russian Relations in the
First Decade of XXI Century

1. Putin’s rise to Power

Unexpectedly, the year 2000 was marked by the significant changes on the Russian
political scene and consequently a shift in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. On 31 December Boris
Yeltsin made a New Year’s address live on the Russian television in which he resigned as a
Russian president and nominated Vladimir Putin, who was supposed to serve as an acting
president up until the presidential elections due to take place on 26 March 2000. 227 President
Yeltsin had taken the entire world by surprise. He had not only resigned half a year before
presidential elections but he nominated a little- known high-ranking KGB officer a new head of a
state. Yeltsin praised Putin as the best man to replace him: “Why hold on to power for another six
months, when the country has a strong person, fit to be president, with whom practically all
Russians link their hopes for the future today? Why should I stand in his way? Why wait for
another six months?”228 In the March election the incumbent Putin won in the first round with
about 53 percent of all votes. One of the reasons why he gained such a political popularity and
227
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won over his greatest opponent Gennady Zyuganov was his hard line stance on the war in
Chechnya. Just a month before the election Russian troops captured Grozny, the capital of the
breakaway region , and thus ended over five-months of fighting. This was widely perceived to be
the first political victory of Putin.
Right after the appointment of the new President, Putin moved to reforming the Russian
policy-making organs as well as reevaluating the policy toward both, the West and “the Near
Abroad”. He decided to create the new strategic concept, placing “the CIS member states on the
top of Russian foreign policy priorities, seeing them as strategic partners and desiring the
integration of the CIS with Russia, in particular in the economic and security spheres.”

229

Therefore the Republic of Moldova not only remained in the sphere of the Russian vital interests
but also became an important international partner.
Putin’s early presidency was characterized by political pragmatism. Moscow resigned
from the policy of the full CIS integration in favor of securing the bilateral agreements in order to
ensure its influence. 230 By ensuring influence in Moldova Russia hoped to slow down Kishinev’s
integration process with the European Union and NATO. Therefore in June 2000 Putin’s
government established special committee headed by Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, to
coordinate the future negotiations of Transnistrian conflict. One month later the committee
presented a draft agreement on the DMR problem with the proposal of creating a Moldovan
confederation. According to the proposal the Transnistrian Republic would have had an equal
status with Moldova within the confederation in order to allow it to greatly influence Moldovan
policy-making. This proposition served perfectly Russian interest because enabled Transniestira
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to have a decisive vote in Kishinev guaranteed a continuing, and direct, Russian influence in
Bessarabian politics.

“Under this draft each side would be allowed to maintain its own

constitution, legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, flag, coat of arms, and national
anthem.“231 Additionally, the Russian Foreign Minister offered to increase the number of Russian
peacekeepers to 26000 (with simultaneous withdrawal of the OGRF troops), allow Ukrainian and
OSCE observers but, on no condition, to involve non-CIS troops in the mission.232 However, both
Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities opposed the implementation of the agreement. The DMR
leadership did not want to accept the removal of any Russian troops from the region while
Moldova did not want to allow the “confederalization” of the country as it would in fact mean the
formation of the independent Transnistrian state.
Meanwhile Moldova itself was rocked by the serious political crisis that lasted from the
end of 1999 till the parliamentary elections in 2001. The political gridlock was rooted in
President Lucinschi’s efforts to strengthen his powers by transforming the country into the
presidential republic. By calling for the referendum on the amendment to the constitution
Lucinschi commenced a long-lasting war with the Moldovan Parliament. The parliamentary
leaders, both non-Communists from the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms and Communists
from The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), charged the current head of
state with responsibility for destabilizing the country, acting for his own interests, and “dictatorial
ambitions”. The parliament started to debate a reform of the constitution aimed at weakening the
presidential power and unexpectedly, on 5 July 2000, the lower house passed three constitutional
amendments strengthening the power of the parliament and making Moldova a parliamentary
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republic in line with a “Westernized model”.
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Under the new law the new president would be

elected by the three-fifths of the vote in the lower house, not in direct elections. The communist
representatives in the parliament who voted in favor of electing the president by parliament
asserted that this change in the constitution would lead the country “ in the direction of a true
parliamentary republic and forestall the creation of a semi-autocratic regime.”234 In practice, the
changes in the constitution allowed the major parties to elect as president its own leaders and thus
in the next parliamentary elections of 2001 to take over important institutions.
The political crisis and the upcoming parliamentary elections proved to be a great
opportunity for the increasingly popular, Communist and pro-Russian Party, and its leader
Vladimir Voronin. That, in turn, was a great chance for Russian authorities to maintain influence
over Moldovan politics through a Communist politician loyal to Moscow. Indeed, during the
election campaign in January 2001, Vladimir Voronin stressed the need for close cooperation
with the Kremlin and the CIS member states and signaled his willingness to make the Russian
language the second official language of the republic.
elections that were held on 25 February
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The results of the parliamentary

2001 surprised everyone, even the Moldovans

themselves. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova won the elections with an
overwhelming constitutional majority in the parliament and thus, gained control over the
presidential elections.
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Hence, ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the

announcement of the existence of an independent Moldovan state, a majority of Moldovan voters
opted for home-coming to power of the main Communist leaders. According to Paul D. Quinlan,
a specialist at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, the main catalysts of the
233

Quinlan, Moldova under Lucinschi…, p.96.
Kendra Lea Vessels, Why is Moldova a country: Russia’s Continued Influence in the Near Abroad (Austin: Report
of the University of Texas, 2011), p.51.
235
B.a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria...,p. 7.
236
B.a., Country Report Moldova, EIU, No. 1 2000, p.8.
234

69

communists’ victory in 2001 elections were “the seemingly inevitable plummeting of the
economy and the resulting penurious living standards with little hope for a change.”237 In early
April, the newly elected lower house without any trouble selected the Communist leader Voronin
as the new president of Moldova. The country became one of the few remaining Communist, proRussian states and henceforth Moscow had a good reason to expect close cooperation with
Kishinev. 238

2. Moldovan Communists rise to power

Some scholars argued that the victory of the Communists would not have been possible
without strong Russian support and influence.239 How did Russia affect the Moldovan elections?
One of the ways in which Russia could have had influenced the Moldovan voters was through the
public media. In accordance with survey conducted by the Eurasia Foundation of European
Integration, “when it comes to confidence in media, the majority of respondents – 67.7 percent
tended to have confidence in Russian TV channels.”240 In that case more then a half of the
population received information about Moldovan, Russian and global politics from Russian
sources.
The efforts Russia put in order to influence the Moldovan elections should not be
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surprising, taking under consideration the profits Moscow gained with the triumph of
Communists in Moldova. The victory of PCRM in the parliamentary elections and the selection
of the first secretary of the Communist Party, Voronin, as head of the state offered the Kremlin a
chance to pursue its own idea for resolving the Transniestrian conflict and to control the political
decisions made in Kishinev. In early 2001 the new leadership declared that for now on Moldova
would be a modern socialist country, “a European Cuba” and Voronin assured that the country’s
foreign policy would “undergo some modifications”. What this meant in practice was turning
toward the East. 241 Indeed, already ten days after the elections Voronin went to Moscow in order
to assured the Kremlin that “Russia has always been, is, and will be the strategic partner in all
areas, including joint actions on the international stage.”242 During this visit Putin also stressed
Russian willingness of the close cooperation by saying that both countries would “work to sustain
their economic links in order to reach together the targets that Moldova has set for itself.”243
In November 2001, just a few months after an appointment of the new president, the
Russian-Moldovan Friendship and Co-operation Treaty was signed. This document provided the
necessary framework for the bilateral relations and stipulated Moscow as the guarantor of
Moldova’s integrity.244 Moreover, under the Treaty’s provisions Russia became the major
mediator and coordinator in a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The Treaty also
provided for cooperation on tax, financial, monetary, trade, and customs policies.
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according to Graeme P. Herd the whole treaty was not made fully public.

246

The document

showed that the Moldova’s Gazprom debts, including the DMR’s amount (around 1 billion
dollars), would be paid by Kishinev.

247

Even more importantly the Treaty included the provision

that the Russian language would play an important role within Moldovan society and therefore
Kuishinev would make an effort to provide all necessary conditions for the Russian language
instruction in Moldovan primary and secondary schools.248 Additionally to the document
described above the communist-dominated parliament has ratified by majority of votes the
intergovernmental agreement on Russian-Moldovan military cooperation that had been signed
already in 1997. The ratified document provided for cooperation in gathering information,
exchange of visits and experience as well as conduct of joint research projects, exercises and
exchange of cadets. 249
As one can clearly see there had never been such a warm atmosphere in RussianMoldovan relations as after the victory of PCMR. In addition to the signed bilateral agreements
the pro-Russian attitude of the Moldovan government was noticeable also in new legislation on
domestic affairs passed by the lower house. In August the Communist leadership decided to
introduce the Russian language as an obligatory subject in all Moldovan schools and to change
the subject previously called “the History of Romanians” to “History of Moldova.”
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The

Communists’ stance on the language issue was expressed by Voronin during his second visit in
Moscow when he said that he would prefer all Moldovans to speak Russian.251 This statement
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and the new language law itself stirred up significant opposition among the non-communist
politicians as well as ordinary Moldovan citizens. It was manifested by mass street rallies during
which the protestors requested the dismissal of the Communist government and asked for the new
parliamentary elections. 252
Even though the economic and politician situation in Moldova was extremely tense the
Communist leadership believed that the pro-Russian approach and the decisions associated with
it would help to settle the Transniestrian problem and, even more importantly, lead to preferential
treatment in Russia - Moldova trade. As presented in the previous chapter “Russia traditionally
represented the largest market for Moldovan goods and at the same time the biggest, if not only,
energy supplier.”253 In 2000 Moldova’s economic dependence on Russia even deepened as the
reciprocal trade for the previous two years had increased nearly six times and was estimated at
more than 534 million dollars in 2000.254 Thus, in order to negotiate advantageous economic
agreements at the end of 2001 year the Moldovan leadership announced willingness to join an
economic union with Belarus and Russia. The Commonwealth of Belarus and Russia, as it was
initially called, was created in April 1996 in order to provide a full political, economic, and social
integration of the two countries. Kishinev’s decision to join the economic structure of the
organization would mean in practice a return to the situation from fifteen years earlier, when
Moldova was still a part of the Soviet Union.
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3. A Great Disappointment

In spite of the efforts Voronin and his government put into the strengthening of ties with
Russia, nothing went the way the Communist had hoped. The signing of the Treaty of Friendship
and Co-operation and the Moldovan proposal to join the economic union with Russia and Belarus
did not encourage Moscow to provide substantial economic assistance to Moldova, especially
when the prices for gas deliveries were concerned. During the meeting of Moldovan Prime
Minister Vesile Tarlev and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov at the beginning of 2002 the
latter clearly stressed that Moscow was not willing to help Kishinev to its own disadvantage and
was going to keep gas prices of the same level. 255 The Prime Minister also stated that high level
of taxes on imports of sugar, alcohol and tobacco would not change in the near future which, in
turn, resulted in a drop of Moldova’s sugar exports by over 90 percent.

256

At the same time

Russian politicians emphasized that that the volume of Russian investment in Bessarabia was
systematically growing and the import of the Moldovan wine amounted to almost 80 percent of
the total volume of the imported wine.257 However Kishinev was not satisfied with the results of
talks and a few days latter Voronin renounced Moldova’s intended integration with the BelarusRussian State Union by saying that Moldova had no interest in joining the organization.258
Similarly, Moscow did not meet the high expectations of Moldovan authorities regarding
its role in the settlement of Transnistrian conflict. Voronin has hoped that the pro-Russian stance
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and the new policy of Communist government would convince Moscow to support Moldova in
the clash with Smirnof and his entourage. It did not really happen. When during the talks on
solving the conflict the DMR leadership refused to make any concessions in negotiations,
Moldova was forced to walk out and apply necessary economic sanctions. Those sanctions
included the introduction of the new custom stamps with the WTO standard’s marks that were not
provided to breakaway region. Thus Transnistria’s exports came under Kishinev’s control.
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At

the same time Voronin asked for Russian support but Putin, although he refused to recognize the
old Transnistrian seals, did not fully back up Voronin and kept subsidizing gas being sold to
Smirnof government. Additionally, at the end of October 2002 the Speaker of Russian Duma,
Gennady Selezniov, publicly announced that the Kremlin would not be able to meet the deadlines
for withdrawing its troops from the region that were agreed on the OSCE summit in Istanbul in
1999.260 Instead Russia requested from the OSCE’s an extension of the deadline to the end of
2003.
The course of events described above and the lack of economic privileges for Moldova in
trade with Russia significantly souredrelation between the two states. Along with resigning from
joining the State Union of Belarus and Russia, the Moldovan government slowly backed away
from the concession on the Russian language. In March 2002 the Moldovan Constitutional Court
ruled the new language laws unconstitutional and declared that the publication of official
documents in Russian was against the state law. More importantly, the Moldovan leadership reevaluated its relations with the West and expressed its willingness to strengthen cooperation with
European countries and Western international organizations like the European Union and NATO.
At the end of 2002 the Moldovan Prime Minister Tarlev stressed that Moldova wished for deeper
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integration with the European structures. The Moldovan parliament also adopted “the program
for the social and economic development of Moldova to 2005, which gave the highest priority to
the country’s participation in the European integration processes.”261 Furthermore, in December
2002, Vladimir Voronin called into being the National Commission for European Integration that
was responsible for elaborating the EU integration strategy and intensifying the co-operation
between various government institutions in this area.262

4. “The Kozak Memorandum”

Is it fairly clear that the Moldovan Communist Party and its leader were caught trying to
balance stronger tendencies toward European organization with a continued pro-Russian stance.
Moscow was not indifferent to Moldova’s increasing European aspirations. At the beginning of
2003 the General Staff in Moscow held back the planned withdrawal of the Russian troops from
Transnistria, which surprised not only Moldova but all sides involved in the negotiations. In
response to those developments Voronin rushed to Moscow in order to request the renewal of
negotiations on the matter of Russian forces in the DMR and the final settlement of the conflict.
After a visit to Moscow on February 9, 2003 the Moldovan president proposed the draft of the
new constitution that would introduce the new Moldovan political identity characterized by a
union of partially self-governing states that would, in turn, satisfy all of the interested sides DMR, Moldova and Russia. Greame P Herd, researcher of the Defense Academy of the United
261
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Kingdom, explained Voronin’s move by saying that “This initiative was President Voronin’s
contribution to a political settlement based on federal principles and appears to operate on the
logic of “ You have the power, we have the control.”263 In response Putin sent to Kishinev Dimitri
Kozak, the deputy head of the presidential administration, as an advisor to consult in the
preparation of the constitution’s draft and prepare the special guideline of the basic principles for
state structures that would lead the drafting.

264

This special guideline, latter called Kozak

Memorandum (Also Kozak Plan), turned out to be another bone of contention in the RussianMoldovan relations. In the summer of 2003 Putin’s specialist without assistance from the OSCE
co-mediators, commenced trilateral talks between Kishinev, Tiraspol and Moscow regarding the
future status of the “common state”. The main goal of the Russian diplomacy was to reach a
constitutional agreement, under which the DMR would remain a separate federal entity within the
greater Moldovan state, thus maintaining Moscow’s influence in Moldovan domestic affairs and
preventing its involvement in European structures.265 In July 2003 the head of the Russian
Presidential administration asked Moldova to present the first draft of the constitution in order to
included the Kremlin’s amendments. Two months latter Kozak returned to Kishinev with an
elaborated draft that included a proposal of creation of the asymmetrical federation (quasi
confederation) with two separate entities, Moldova and Transnistria, that would have their own
constitutions, executive, legislative and judicial bodies, budget, taxes and state property.266
Surprisingly the answer of Moldovan authorities was positive and it was Smirnof who did not
accept Moscow’s proposal. DMR authorities felt that this solution would not allow them eventual
separation from Moldova and the proposed neutrality of the state would not guarantee the future
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presence of the Russian army on Transniestrian territory. Under those circumstances Dimitri
Kozak returned to Moscow without any signed documents. Yet, unexpectedly, Moscow decided
to amend the elaborated memorandum. On November 14, 2003 Minister Kozak handed to
Ambassador William Hill of the OSCE Mission in Kishinev the ready-made “Memorandum on
the Basic Principles for the State Structure of the United State in Moldova” and thus made the
document public. 267 On the day later the memorandum was presented to the all concerned parties
and on November 25 officially signed by the Russian President.268 The current plan established
the asymmetrical federation that at this time would have consisted of three entities: historical
Moldova with majority population of Moldovan decent, the Moldovan Dniestr Republic and
Gagauzian Republic, all of which would have its own executive, legislative and judiciary bodies
as well as separate budgets. Moreover there were supposed to be establish federal institutions that
would correspond to the local ones. Even more importantly, according to the proposed draft, the
Transnistrian minority would basically be given veto power vote in the two-chambered federal
Parliament on most of the significant issues.269 For instance, in the federal 26-seat upper house
the DMR would have 9 senators, Gagauzia 4 and Bessarabia 13, which would signified that in
case of the voting on crucial issues historical Moldova would not be able to reach the required
approval by 75 percent, even with the support of the Gagauzia’s representatives.270 The DMR and
Gagauzia would also have an large influence on the makeup of the federal government “ as the
prime minister would require upper house confirmation and the two first deputies would be
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appointed with agreement of the two regional parliaments.”271 But this was not the end of the
provisions threatening the Moldovan position within the planned federation. The most important
problems, the stationing of the Russian troops in DMW and the status of Russian language, were
also settled by Kozak in favor of the separatist territory. Although initially the Memorandum
included the provision that the Federation of Moldova would be a neutral, demilitarized country
and would not maintain its own army, the document did not refer to the presence of the Russian
army. The day after releasing the document Smirnof demanded the inclusion to the memorandum
that Russian would be the state official language of the entire territory and that the Russian
peacekeeping forces would be present in DMR for the next 30 years.272 Voronin, who at that time
was sure that his Russian stance would lead to the replacement of the current Transnistrian
leadership, was taken by surprise by the Russian answers to Smirnof’s demands.273 The Russian
Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, during the official meeting with DMR leader guaranteed that
Russian troops would be present up until the 2024 and that the next draft of the memorandum
would include a provision on the Russian language to become the second official language in the
future Moldovan state. 274
The international players, so far actively involved in the peace process in the region, were
deeply surprised by such a trajectory. They were not only excluded from the work on the draft but
first and foremost, they were not even informed that such negotiations were taking place. The
OSCE and Ukrainian co-mediators eventually found out about the three-sided consultations on
the new constitutions from the DMR leadership that, unsatisfied with the current draft, purposely
leaked the information to the OSCE representatives and insisted on commencing five-sided talks
271
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as in previous years.
immediately

275

asked

After the news on the secret talks reached the co-mediators they
to

join

the

negotiations

and

to

be

allowed

to

access the prevailing results of negotiations. Moscow firmly refused. This and the fact that the
Russian proposal included many provisions unacceptable for the government in Kishinev led to
the rise of a strong opposition to the Kozak Memorandum from the European, OSCE and
American administrations. They argued that under such conditions the DMR would have a
blocking majority in the federal government while in the regional institutions would exercise a
total willfulness. Thus, right after the document was made public the representatives of the
various Western countries and organizations scheduled urgent meetings with the Moldovan
president who, at that time still had a decisive power within the Moldovan state.
At first Kishinev’s reaction to the proposed draft was positive. Voronin argued that
although some regulations would have to be reevaluated the benefits of the incorporated new
constitution absolutely overweighted the chance of a flare-up of conflict in the region.276 The
Russian plan of the “common state” was actually initiated by the Moldovan president who
dreamed to be the one bringing peace to the region and thus he wanted to carry through the
negotiations at all costs.

277

Nevertheless the President immediately found himself under the

domestic and foreign pressure not to sign the proposed draft. At the beginning of November 2003
the chairman of OSCE, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, met with Voronin and strongly encouraged the
Moldovan politician to reject the “asymmetrical federation’ plan pointing out that the Russian
proposal was an attempt “to impose a distorted political and economic system on a fragmented
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country” in order to cement Russian domination of Moldova.278 Additionally, almost all of the
members of NATO and EU as well as United States rejected the plan by stating that the
implemented new constitution would prevent Moldova from cooperating independently with
Western states and endangered the possibility for the country to ever become the member of the
European Union.279
Eventually, Voronin backed away from the agreement at the last minute. The plan was due
to be signed on November 25, 2003. Minister Kozak arrived in the Moldovan capital a day earlier
for the ceremony but President Voronin called off the meeting a couple of hours before its
planned commencement. What made Vornonin decide to reject the plan? Opinions are divided.280
In numerous interviews he claimed that the reason he did not accept the proposal was that the
settlement allowed Russian troops to be stationed in the Republic for next 20 years. 281 However,
Matthew Crandall in his article, “Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: The Transnistrian
Effect” argued that “given the fact that Voronin initialed the agreement previously, it is plausible
that without the fierce international opposition an agreement would have been reached” and
Kishinev was disposed to accept Russian domination.282 John Lowenhardt from the Clindael
Institute shared this view and claimed that the pressure from EU, USA and OSCE and the fear of
the repetition of the “Georgian scenario” had play the major role in Voronin’s decision. 283
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5. The Diplomatic Downturn

Regardless of the reasons, the consequences of that decision were easy to predict. Russia
failed to meet the deadline for withdrawing its troops from DMR, which had been settled earlier
during the 2002 OSCE meeting. The Transnistrian leaders at first did not want to accept
Moldovan rejection of the plan and stated that they “do not renounce the Kozak Memorandum
and are ready to sign it even tomorrow.”284 Therefore, in January 2004, the three sides of the
negotiations, this time along with the representatives of OSCE and Ukraine, met in Sofia in order
to work on amendments to the current proposal. Moldovan experts presented the mediators with
the new draft called “ Declaration of the basic principles of a State Structure of the Republic of
Moldova.” that significantly decreased the Transniestrian stranglehold on the federation’s politics
while at the same time continued to provide it with a blocking majority in the Federation’s upper
house.285 However, Smirnof insisted on signing the Kozak Memorandum in its original version
proposed by the Russian side. Tiraspol declared that if Kishinev refused to accept Kozak
Memorandum, for reasons known only for Moldovan side, the DMR had its own draft of a new
constitution that included the confederation of two states that would have equal status within the
country.286 This proposal meant de facto the end of the negotiations on “the asymmetrical
federation” as none of the sides wanted to agree on this settlement.
Meanwhile Moscow had been showing its discontent with Moldova’s attitude. Dimitrij
Kozak accused Voronin of lack of political courage and being unreliable while Putin canceled
284

Jan Maksymiuk, Analisis: Transnister wants Talks on ‘Federal System’ with Moldova, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, accessed online 17 September 2012, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/53bc0d6b-d61b-49bb-8f7ae563715de8b9.html
285
B.a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria..., p.26.
286
B.a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria..., p.26.

82

planed official visit to the Moldovan capital.287 The growing criticism from the OSCE and UE
representatives regarding the presence of Russian troops on DMR territory just added fuel to the
fire. Russian relations with both the western organizations as well as with Moldova, significantly
worsened. On the one hand Foreign Minister Ivanov criticized the OSCE for undermining a
potential settlement of the conflict and refused to continue five-sided negotiations. On the other
hand in 2004 Moscow did not invite Kishinev to join the CIS Common Economic Area at the
Yalta summit, which was a big surprise for the Moldovan government taking under consideration
that it expressed a desire to join the project already in 2001.288
Yet, the worst moment for the Russian-Moldovan relations came with the breaking off of
the Tiraspol-Kishinev talks in July 2004. The heat-up in the conflict was due to the DMR’s
harassment of the Moldovan language school that used non-Cyrillic script.289 The authorities
closed the schools, removed all the equipment and transferred all the students to Cyrillic-script
schools in different towns by claiming that the Moldovan institutions violated Transnistrian law,
which required schools to use Cyrillic alphabet.290 Additionally, within a few weeks, authorities
in Tiraspol prohibited the Moldovan farmers from to access their fields in Transnistrian
territory.291 Such an anti-Moldovan attitude raised an enormous objection in Kishinev. Yet the
Kremlin, which was always very careful in backing any of sides, this time definitely supported
Smirnoff. When Kishinev responded to the dispute with the suspension of the custom service to
Transniestrian enterprises that were not officially registered in Kishinev and canceled all the
privileges of DMR businesses, the Russian Foreign Ministry along with the DMR leader called
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this measure an economic blockade.292 Moldova was clearly displeased. In December 2004,
Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan gave an interview to Latvian media where he stated
that“ 1500 Russian troops in Transnistria is a military occupation.”293 At the same time a similar
statement was made by President Voronin himself who furthermore declared that from now on
the main aim of Moldovan foreign policy was going to be the strengthening of co-operation with
the EU that would enable future membership in the organization. Russia reacted immediately. At
the end of 2004 the Russian Ambassador to Moldova, Nikolai Ryabov, explicitly threatened the
Republic by saying that too close relations with European partners would have tragic
consequences for the fate of the country. 294

6. Economic Blackmail

Indeed, when Russia began to carry out its threat and imposed economic sanctions on
Moldovan products, the country’s economy significantly declined. Imposition of sanctions had
already turned out to be an effective tool as in the case of forcing Moldova into the CIS in 1994
and thus became “an established instrument of the country’s increasingly muscular foreign
policy.”295 In March 2005 the Russian Ambassador announced that “The Russian government is
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weighing a variety of economic sanctions that could be imposed against Moldova in retaliation
for what it considers unfriendly actions by the former Soviet republic.” 296 By unfriendly actions
the politician meant Kishinev’s political decisions as a result of the “school crisis”. According to
Interfax News, Moscow at first considered an embargo on alcohol and tabacco products, doubling
the prices on imported energy supplies and introducing new regulations regarding entry visas for
Moldovan citizens.297 In fact the Russian government on 18 April 2005 began with the embargo
of Moldovan meat under a veil of opinion of the experts that “Moldovan meat unfits the
qualitative veterinary and sanitary security standards compared with the meat of Ukraine, a
country which holds modern meat processing facilities.”298 However, Moscow soon found out
that this sanction would not hit the Moldovans as much as they previously expected because
domestic demand for the product was growing constantly and the exported product covered the
requisition of the domestic market. Therefore, Russia moved to the next stage of economic
blockade and a month later it decided to hit the most important industries in Moldova,
agricultural products and winemaking. Especially the banning of the export of the latter had a
great impact on the condition of the Moldovan economy as in 2005 the wine export generated
25% of the countries GDP with Russia as the main export market accounting for almost 85% of
the total export.299 The official reason for the ban was the lack of the quality control. At the
beginning of December 2005 the exporters of the agricultural products and winemakers informed
that As in result of the Russian boycott they had lost from 40% to 80% of their yearly incomes.300
However it was noteworthy after a while the embargo hit mostly the Russian entrepreneurs as
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the winemaking industry was dominated by businessmen of Russian desent. Another outcome of
the economic embargo, surely not intended by the Kremlin authorities, was strengthening
business links between producers from Moldova and Romania.
That was not the end of the economic blackmail though. In Autumn 2005 Moscow
pressured Kishinev by using what can be called the "energy arm" and informed Voronin that
Kremlin was no longer going to subsidize Moldovan gas supplies and requested repayment of the
energy debt.301 “The current price of 80 dollars per 10000 cubic meters was well below the
market value and Russia did not see the need to subsidize Moldovan energy.”302 Kishinev,
although well aware of the situation, was not able to pay back the debt, which by the way was a
Transnistrian debt.303 Therefore Kremlin demanded the remining shares in Moldovagaz. Gazprom
owned 50 percent of Moldovagaz, the only national gas operator in the Republic 35.33% of its
shares was owned by Moldovan state, and 13.44% by the DMR. 304 By taking over the company
Moscow would eliminate possible transit blockades and would strengthen its energy supplies
monopoly in Eastern Europe. Moreover at the end of 2005 Moscow announced the doubling of
the gas price, which meant that in 2006 Moldova would have to pay 160 dollars for 1000 cubic
meters - the highest sum among all CIS members. Finally, in order to show the seriousness of the
Russian threat Moscow with the helping hand of the Transnistrian power station in Ciuciurgan
suspended the gas supplies to Moldova for a short period of time.
Yet, the above-mentioned conflicts were not only the result of the failure of the Kozak
memorandum and the DMR-Moldova dispute. They were also strictly related to Moscow’s
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attempt to influence the outcome of the parliamentary elections in March 2005 and were an
element of its greater political strategy. As presented earlier in their paper with the failure of the
Russian proposal of the DMR-Moldova conflict settlement Vladimir Voronin automatically
became in Moscow persona non grata. Thus in the forthcoming elections, Russia decided not to
back the Moldovan Communist Party and instead supported the strongest opposition party. This
decision surprised, to say the least, both the Moldovan and Russian politicians as the main
opposition party, Democratic Moldova, was known to be dominated by nationalists with a strong
anti-Russian stance. Moreover, the leaders of the opposition, Serafin Urekian, Nikolai Andronik
and Dimitri Bragish, were so far presented mostly in the Russian press as lawbreakers involved in
smuggling and other criminal activities. 305 Yet, regardless the Russian support for the opposition
KPM again won the parliamentary elections by taking 46% of the votes. Although this was not
enough to be able to elect the new president on their own, the number of seats allowed the
Communists to be able to easily form a coalition for the Presidential voting.306 The Democratic
Moldova party (which due to the Moscow support suddenly started to be perceived as proRussian and anti-European) won only 28% of the votes and in fact did not have any real impact
on law-making procedures in the Moldovan parliament.307
It is also worth noting that the day before the elections the Moldovan authorities, aware of
the Russian attempts to affect the ballot, forbade around 100 Russian observers to enter the
country.308 Additionally, on the day of the elections several persons of Russian descent were
arrested and charged with spying. Consequently, the opposition backed by the Kremlin claimed
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the election fraud but International observers headed by OSCE representatives announced that the
elections broadly met the democratic standards.309 This failure of the Russian meddling was
confirmed couple of weeks later when Communist Party formed a coalition with the proRomanian Christian Democrats and easily elected Vladimir Voronin for his second term. Now the
only question remained: Would the Moldovan leader continued his pro-European policy or will
see the reconciliation Russian partners?

7. East or West? Which Course to Choose?

Right after the end of the negotiations on the “Kozak Memorandum” the answer was
simple: Voronin administration had made European Union integration its foreign policy priority.
This is not surprising, taking under consideration that with an upset Russia, strongly supporting
Smirnof and applying economic sanctions, Western partners were the only choice Voronin
actually had. The European Union welcomed the new pro-European stance and automatically
became more involved in the situation in Moldova. Thus, at the beginning of 2005 Brussels
initiated the signing of the EU Action Plan on Moldova, which contained the practical guidance
for the development of EU-Moldova relations and determined the steps Kishinev had to take in
order to enable the future accession.310 The Republic also signed the agreement of European
Neighborhood Policy which, among other things, designated the EU to become a co-mediator in
the Tiraspol-Kishinev negotiations. Since the change of course in Moldovan foreign policy,
309
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Kishinev started also to closely cooperate with the USA. As a result, the U.S. representatives
joined the five-sided talks on a resolution to the conflict, which now adopted the new form ”5+2”, with the two Western participants becoming official observers.311 In this new format the
sides met three times but without any significant progress, the negotiations were suspended. Yet
Voronin kept on developing friendly relations with the West, which was confirmed by the
European Commission opening of an office in Kishinev, appointing Adriaan Jacobovits de
Szeged as its head and finally devoting 9 million dollars for fighting the economic consequences
caused by the Russian embargo. Simultaneously, on 19 May 2006 Moldovan authorities agreed
to sign the “Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO”, showing their strong willingness to
join the Western military alliance. At the same time the U.S. leaders declared that they were
ready to take a part in the demilitarization of Transnistria. The warm-up of Moldovan relations
with the West clearly indicated a shift in Kishinev’s foreign policy. As Kaljurand puts it, “this
was a clear message to Russia that Moldova had lost confidence in Russia and had taken
determined steps towards Europe.”312
The new orientation towards European integration was visible also in domestic affairs. At
the end of 2005 the Moldovan parliament voted to request a total withdrawal of the Russian
peacekeeping forces and ammunitions supplying them from DMR by December of 2006.

313

The decision was backed up by the leaders in Washington who stated that if Russia would not
withdraw its troops, the USA would not ratify an agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) while GUAM stated officially that separatism in Eurasia had been aroused mostly by
Russian manipulation.314 This just made Moscow’s hackles rise. The Kremlin not only stated that
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it did not need to enter the CFE, but also the Foreign Policy Minister announced that the Russian
army should stay in Transnistria even after the end of the conflict in the region. 315 Further on
March 2006 Moscow recalled its Ambassador in Kishinev for consultations. Even the later
announcement by Vladimir Lupu, the speaker of Moldovan parliament, that Moldova would
consider exiting the CIS, did not change the Russian’s hard stance on the policy toward the
weaker partner and therefore Voronin was forced to reconsider his attitude toward Kremlin.
Indeed, the Communist leaders did their best to avoid the announced increase of gas
prices. Throughout the entire year 2006 Moldova negotiated with Russia and its President kept on
traveling to Moscow for the closed-door talks.316 Allegedly the Moldovans offered the Kremlin
great opportunities for the investment in the country, including taking part in the privatization
process and purchase of the shares in Moldovagaz. The content of the negotiations was not
released to the public, which understandably alarmed Moldovan public opinion. The rumors had
it that Voronin had agreed to cede the Transnistrian shares in the gas operator but this was quickly
denied by the Minister of Economy Valeriu Lazar.317 The talks on the gas prices lasted up until
the end of the 2006 year when in December, finally, the sides reached the agreement which
indicated that the gas price would be increased gradually from 160$ per 1000 cubic mater to 300
dollars in 2011.318 This agreement was considered a great victory for the Russian diplomacy.
Moscow not only was going to received the demanded price for the energy supplies, but most of
all it seemed as if it had succeeded in turning back Moldova from its pro-European course. This
should not be considered a surprise. The increasingly weak Communist Party of Moldova did not
have a choice but to reconsider the Western orientation and to find the way to somehow settle the
315
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recent conflict with Russia and thus regain the support on the domestic scene. Moreover,
Moldova’s location on the geopolitical map and lack of the alternatives in the energy dispute left
the authorities in Kishinev without much of a choice. Not without fault was the European Union.
Throughout the entire 2004-2006 periods Europe seemed not to notice the upcoming energy crisis
and focused on subsidizing the Moldovan agriculture sector, which was obviously much easier
than for example subsidizing the energy supplies. It might had seemed that the European
member-states were hesitant whether to fully involve themselves in Moldovan affairs and as a
result expose themselves to Russian political anger.319 In this case Kishinev was actually left out
by its Western partners and therefore forced to look for a settlement with Gazprom.

8. Pleasing Russia

Indeed, the beginning of 2007 clearly showed that Moldova had forgotten about its
European ambitions. The Moldovan government officially announced that as a consequence of
the Russian-Moldovan settlement on energy supplies, Voronin had agreed for Gazprom to take
over the Transnistrian shares in Moldovagaz, two thermal-electric power stations, and control
over power lines exporting electricity to the Balkan states.320 Thereby Moscow received 63,4% of
stocks in the biggest national gas operator in Moldova and was able to control the distribution
network and the transit lines that embodied one of the major goals of Putin’s new energy
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strategy. 321 Additionally, in order to take full control over the Moldovan power system RAO, one
of the largest Russian energy operators purchased the power plant “Jes” that was located on the
Transnistrian territory. 322
Apart from the negotiations regarding energy prices the Moldovan President conducted
closed-door talks with Putin’s administration concerning a new proposal for conflict resolution in
Moldova. The news about the secret talks was first released by the well known political annalist
of the Eastern Europe, Vladimir Socor in the webpage of the Jamestown Foundation. Namely,
Socor claimed in the article that Voronin was ready for significant concessions that were
unacceptable to any of the Western partners.323 This report earned the wrath of Moldovan public
opinion. In response, 18 publicists, journalists, diplomats and politicians published an open letter
calling President Voronin to reveal the outcome of the negotiations.324 Despite early assurances
that such a meeting did not take place, the Presidential administration in April 2007 admitted that
similar two-sided negotiations had commenced (during the talks Tiraspol was represented by
Russian mediators). Among other decisions, the Moldovan chef of state allegedly agreed on the
permanent presence of the Russian peacekeeping forces and the neutrality of the country, which,
if applied, would once and for all prevent Kishinev from entering NATO.
The fact that that the Russian-Moldovan negotiations had actually taken place seemed to
be confirmed by the subsequent political decisions taken by both sides. For instance, Kishinev’s
representatives refused to take part in the two GUAM summits, meetings of the organization that
was perceived as the counterbalance to CIS. Further more, Moldovan authorities rewrote the
proposal of the National Security Concept in 2007, removed all the articles that could upset
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Moscow and thus proved that “the security policy had been adjusted to Russia’s wishes.” 325 This
gesture was in turn appreciated by the Kremlin and Moscow slowly started to lift the economic
blockade. Firstly in April 2007 the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry along with
Federal Office of the Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection allowed Moldovan fruits and
vegetables to return to the Russian market.

326

However the winemaking enterprises patiently

waited for the lifting of the wine embargo that was promised to happen already at the beginning
of the year after the open threat that Kishinev would block Russia’s planned entry to the World
Trade Organization. The hard stance can be explained by the fact that the loses of the
winemaking industry were overwhelming and hit the heart of the Moldovan economy. Radio Free
Europe informed that “the Moldova-Vin export agency estimated the loss in sales for the wine
industry at over $180 million between March 2006 and January 2007… while Moldova's wine
production dropped dramatically -8.96 dekaliters of bottled wine in 2006, a 63-percent decrease
from 2005.”327 Only in June 2007 did Voronin publically announced that the Kremlin had lifted
the ban but even so only 20 out of 179 plants had authorization for exporting their products to the
Russian Federation. 328
The entire year 2008 was marked by the warm-up in Russian-Moldovan relations,
especially regarding the settlement of the “frozen conflict”. Voronin stated that during the CIS
summit on February 29, 2008 Putin promised to reassume the “5+2” negotiations and
furthermore that Russia had tentatively agreed to replace its troops in the DMR with civilian
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missions of international observers.

329

In order to commence the talks Moscow had to first

convince Smirnof to sit at the table with USA, UE and Voronin himself. According to
Kommiersant’s report, Putin’s administration de facto forced DMR leaders to meet with Heikki
Talvetie, the Special Representative of the head of OSCE, during which Smirnof eventually
agreed to negotiate with other co-mediators, at the same time signalizing, however that DMR
would not give up its usual conditions.330 Even more important for Moldova was the statement of
Russian Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin who assured that Russia would never use the so called
“Kosovo procedure”, which meant it would never recognize the Transnistrian independence. The
Chairman of the Commission for CIS Co-operation later confirmed those assurances during his
visits to Kishinev and Tiraspol where he tried to push DMR authorities to find the way to settle
things with Voronin.
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Ostrovski mentioned at the same time that in order to maintain good

relations with Moscow Voronin should reconsider Moldova’s membership in GUAM.
Russian-Moldovan co-operation was developing ideally. The closest associates of
Moldovan President, Marka Tkaczuka, Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sovy, and Dmitri
Socolana paid couple of visits to Russian officials to discuss the details of the settlement
proposal. Additionally, Voronin during his meeting with Moscovite Patriarch Aleksei II talked
about the ”common future of both counties” and their “eternal friendship”.
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One could easily

assume that Voronin had returned to a Pro-Russian orientation with a relief. Indeed, some
Moldovan politicians argued that the Moldovan President’s heart always belonged to Moscow
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and his abandonment of pro-European course was a sign of common sense and was consistent
with the country’s political position.

333

His warm feelings toward Moscow had translated to the

favorable treatment in negotiating the country’s energy debt and prices. When Moldovan ViceMinister Zinaida Greciani arrived at the Kremlin to discuss this question, Russia announced the
possibility of reconsidering its energy prices strategy. Although one could argue that this cannot
be called a successful negotiation, but taking under consideration the size of debt that amounted
for 1,8 mil dollars, any concession on that matter could be called a victory.
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But as always the

Kremlin’s promises had their own price. Pursuant to Russia’s will Voronin did not attend GUAM
summit in Batumi on July 1, 2008 and instead sent the country's deputy minister of foreign affairs
and European integration, Valeriu Ostalep.335

9. Elections crisis. Moldovan Communists lose power

Nevertheless, the Communist Party’s efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow were also
dictated by the wider political strategy of the party whose major goal was to win the upcoming
parliamentary elections in 2009. Indeed, as shown earlier, the Russian support has always been an
important factor in Moldovan elections. By pursuing the pro-Russian policies and thus finally
settling the long-lasting conflict in the region Voronin and his party would have had the election
victory sewn up. Russia on the other hand, by supporting Communist Party could pursue its own
333
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foreign policy, which translated into maintaining dominance in the region and preventing the
Western players from becoming involved. That is why on February 24, 2009 the Russian Foreign
Minister came to Kishinev to emphasize Moscow’s support for Communist Party and its leader.
Lavrov used also the opportunity of pre-election tensions and tried to encourage Kishinev to
eliminate the UE and USA from the negotiations and focus on a tri-lateral settlement.

336

Furthermore, in order to boost Voronin’s chances Russia offered 500 million dollars per month
before the July elections.337 Modlova did not take up the offer of the loan but instead agreed on
conducting three-sided negotiations, Kishinev-Tiraspol-Moscow without the presence of Western
co-mediators. Moreover, on March 18, 2009 during the meeting of Medvedev with Smirnof and
Voronin, the latter eventually accepted the current format of the peacekeeping mission in
Transnistira, resigning from the previous plan to replace Russian troops with an international
civilian mission. 338
However, this effort to please Russia and most of all Russian and pro-Russian voters did
not bring the expected results during the parliamentary elections on 5 April 2009. As a result of
the elections the Communist Party won the majority of the seats, 60 out of 101, but was not able
to elect a new president, as the new president , which required a three-fifths of parliamentary
majority. Because none of the opposition representatives wanted to vote in favor of the
Communists candidate, Zinaida Greciani, Voronin was forced to dissolve the Parliament and set
early elections for July 29, the same year.
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Russian authorities wanting to assure that this time

PCRM will win the required 61 seats, once again expressed their support for Voronin’s party and
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repeated its loan offer. This did not help out the Communists in the July elections. This time they
won 12 seats less than the last time, that were transferred to the opposition coalition, Alliance for
European Integration (AEI). As a result it was the opposition parties oriented to the West that
won with a slender majority.340 On top of that in September 2009 Voronin resigned after 8 years
in the office and passed the role of acting President to the current speaker of parliament, Liberal
Party leader Mihai Ghimpu, until a new presidential election could be held in parliament.

341

Unfortunately this move “ended in a stalemate.”342 The Parliament was not able to select a new
President for almost three years during which the country was plunged into the serious political
crisis.
The results of the July election took Russian leaders by surprise. The victory of the
European oriented parties striving for reconciliation with Romania was a real threat to Russian
dominance in the region. Andrei Makarychev of the Nizhny Novogrod Civil Service Academy
claimed that “the defeat of the Communist Party of Moldova in the repeat parliamentary election
of 2009 and the resignation of President Vladimir Voronin have deeply challenged Russia’s
position in this geographically small, yet politically very important, country… and made Moscow
reshape its policies toward Chisinau.”343 Indeed, in the aftermath of the announcement of the
election results, the most important Kremlin leaders, President Medvedev, Minister Lavrov and
Russian Minister of Finance Aleksei Kudrin rushed to Kishinev under the veil of an upcoming
CIS summit in the capital. To the surprise of all Medvedev met with Marian Lubu, the AEI
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Presidential candidate and officially invited him for the CIS meeting. By doing so Moscow
showed that its priority was to maintain a strong influence in the country no matter ruled it,
Communists or Nationalists. At the same time the Kremlin’s diplomacy underlined that the new
Moldovan leadership could not count on Russia changing its mind on the presence of Russian
troops and would be grateful if the AEI accepted the “Kozak Memorandum” from 2003. 344 They
mentioned Kozak’s proposal on purpose. Their main goal was to show dissatisfaction with the
election’s outcome and that in such new circumstances Russia was not going to continue the
policy of concessions. Aside of from traditional foreign policy instruments like blackmail,
Moscow introduced also a new “soft power approach” aimed at strengthening the Russianelement in the country. Russia decided to get what it wanted by using persuasion rather than
coercion, for instance, by economic assistance and cultural exchanges.345 Thereby Moscow
financed pro-Russia movements like “ Novaia Moldova” of “Russia’s Friend” as well as repeated
its pre-election loan offer.
At first the Russian approach worked perfectly. The Western- oriented government agreed
on February 2010 to extend the existing agreement on the energy supplies with the Power plant in
Transnistria owned by Russian concern Inter RAO JES.346 Thereby the new leadership showed
that it was going to continue the energy policy commenced by Voronin and allowed Moscow to
maintain full control over Moldova’s energy sector. Yet the impasse in the Russian-Moldovan
relations began again two months latter. The crisis was caused by the acting President Mihai
Ghimpu, decision, not to attend the celebrations of the 65th anniversary of the victory in II World
344
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War in Moscow. 347 This decision was strictly related with the upcoming parliamentary elections
and revealed the real ambitions of some of the pro-Western politicians. In face of this political
statement on the part of the coalition in power and the elections in November the same year
Russia decided to confound the pro-Western AEI and thus again back the Moldovan Communists.
In order to do so on July 19, 2010 the Chief of the Sanitary Inspection Giennadi Onishchenko
announced the reintroduction of a ban on Moldovan wine. Furthermore, as in 2005, the embargo
was followed by a ban on fruits and vegetables. Those political actions did not bring the expected
result though. In the fourth-parliamentary election in two years the governing coalition gained 59
seats, while the PCRM received only 42 mandates.348 Moreover, the government remained
almost the same and an the no longer favored by Moscow Vlad Filat was reappointed a Prime
Minister.349
The entire decade of the Russian-Moldovan relations was therefore marked alternately by
the successes and failures of Russian diplomacy in maintaining dominance in Moldova. When in
2001 the Communist Party headed by Vladimir Voronin came to power one would assume that
having things in hand would be an easy task for Kremlin. Yet it seemed that Russia overestimated
Voronin’s pro-Russian stance, ignoring his European aspirations and political consciousness.
However, it proved later that the hard power instruments toward Kishinev worked very well and
the Moldovan government returned to a pro-Russian course. Not without unpleasant
consequences , however. The constant political and economic sabotage and dual strategy toward
Western players resulted in Russia’s lost of credibility in the eyes of the Moldovan society and
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the international community. Nevertheless, during the ten years Kremlin managed to achieve
some of Putin’s foreign policy goals. It took almost full control over the Moldovan energy sector
and was able to maintain strong influence in Transnistira. Moldova, on the other hand, turned out
to be less successful in pursuing its objectives. It had lost on every front, beginning with
European integration.
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Conclusion

1. Current Situation in Brief

The Russians’ striving over maintaining strong influence on political life in the Republic
of Moldova has continued. The areas in which the Russian authorities have been using their tools
in order to pursue Moscow’s interests also remained unchanged: the issues of Transnistria, energy
supplies and trade regulations. The last 20 years of Moldova- Russian relations prove that
whenever, as during the early elections organized due to the Parliament’s incapability to select a
President, the pro-Russian camp was loosing mandates, Moscow, instead of strengthening its
position by using soft power, decided more often to use political and economic sabotage in order
to keep the region within Russian sphere of influence. The resolution of Transnistria conflict and
the presence of the Russian peacekeeping mission are the main issues of Moldova-Russia
relations recently. For instance, when the pro-European coalition won the parliamentary elections
in Moldova at the end of November 2010 the Kremlin refused to continue the negotiations over
the DMR issue in order to show that the Russians believed that only the Communist Party would
be capable of carrying out the talks. But only recently has it turned out that the Western oriented
parties have not been the only factor that have been disturbing Russian domination in the country.
DMR leaders began to formulate their own independent policy toward the government in
Kishinev, not necessarily synchronized with the one performed by Moscow. Since the last thing
101

Smirnof wanted the reunion of the breakaway region with the rest of the Republic (which was the
main goal of the Russia-initiated negotiations), the lack of understanding between AEI and Putin
well corresponded with his interests. That is why Smirnof openly supported the Moldovan proEuropean government in order to remain the only guarantor of the Russian interest in the region.
For instance, the invitation of the President of the breakaway region to Prime Minister Filat to
jointly attend the international football game in Tiraspol was a clear demonstration of divergence
between Transnistria’s and Russia’s approach toward the government in Kishinev .
This, again, set in motion the traditional mechanism of Russian foreign policy towards
Kishinev. On February 2011 the Russian Ambassador to Moldova, Valeri Kuzmin, suggested that
Gazprom could rethink the announced increase in gas prices if Kishinev agreed to accept the
Russian military presence in the DMR. 350 This offer was not aimed only at stressing that no deal
could be made behind Moscow’s back but most notably at strengthening the division among the
pro-European coalition’s parties, between supporters and opponents of intensification of cooperation with the Kremlin before elections planned for November 2011. Putin’s government also
did not hesitate to show its dissatisfaction with the political decision of the Democratic Party of
Moldova, which had chosen to unify with pro-Romanian party headed by Filat instead of forming
a coalition with Voronin. Therefore, when Lupu arrived in Moscow for an official visit as speaker
of the Moldovan Parliament none of the Russian newspapers even mentioned his visit while the
meeting of speaker of DMR Parliament, Anatolii Kaminski, with Russian leaders was widely
commented in local media. 351
Meanwhile Tiraspol continued conducting an independent policy toward the Western oriented central government. Smirnof was even able to muster its support for initiating the peace
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negotiations, without any assistance from Moscow, in exchange for lifting the trade
restrictions.352 But according to the specialists from the Center of Eastern Studies in Warsaw the
current offer was just a carrot on the stick that was supposed to enable DMR authorities to gain
significant economic privileges in exchange for empty political promises.353 The answer from
Moscow was a sudden removal of endorsement for Smirnof and an announcement of support for
the new Presidential candidate of DMR, Anatolii Kaminski.
The empty promises also characterized the Russian approach towards the Moldovan
leadership. For example, Moscow invited Kishinev to sign the CIS Free Trade Agreement on
February 10, 2012. Although theoretically the Free Trade Agreement was supposed to put an end
to the constant economic sabotage performed by Russia, the document was full of exclusions
from the Free Trade Zone that included the most important trade products like agriculture
products, alcohol and, of course, gas. At the same time it’s important to remember that the offer
to join the Zone was an element of the Russian pre-election campaign in Moldova that was aimed
at supporting the pro-Russian political element. Finally, on 16 March 2012, after the stalemate
that had lasted for almost 3 years, AEI managed to nominate a new President, Supreme
Magistrate Council Chair and Judge Nicolae Timofti, and by doing so it confirmed Moldova’s
European ambitions. As usual this did not go without unpleasant consequences for Republic of
Moldova. Right after the nomination the Russian Minister of Defence Anatolij Sierdiukow and
the Special Representative for Transnistria Dimitri Rogozin rushed to the breakaway region to
confirm Russia’s vital economic and political interests in the DMR. Russian officials did not
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inform the government in Kishinev about the visit which was a clear statement that the Kremlin
was going to ignore the theoretical integrity of the two entities. Moreover, just recently Moscow
urged Moldova to quit the EU Energy Cooperation Agreement. On September 12, 2012 the
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak told reporters “First of all, we propose that Moldova
denounce the protocol on entering the Europe energy community agreement. This is a
precondition for us to discuss the issue of gas price cuts and the relief of debt, which at the
moment amounts to $4.1 billion.”354

2. What next?

When in 2009 the Alliance for European Integration came to power in Moldova most of
the observers announced a new era in the relations between governments in Kishinev and
Moscow. For the first time the Russian influence in Moldova became significantly threatened as
Kishinev stated its serious interest in the European integration. Taking into consideration Russia's
geopolitics the election's results started the beginning of political and economic turmoil in the
region. Yet, even after the pro-European parties came to power relations did not change much and
were basically characterized by usual ups and downs. Why? It seemed like none of the Moldovan
factions could really commit to either the Eastern or Western side, balancing between them
constantly. Kaljurand went even further, describing the leaders in Kishinev as “corrupt and
authoritarian playing a rather pragmatic game of perpetual maneuvering between East and West
354
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to strengthen their own position.”

355

They kept sending contradictory messages to their Russian

partner and the European Union and that is why the country lost the credibility in the eyes of
international players.
Yet it can be argued that in his conclusions Kaljurand went too far. One cannot forget that
Moldova's turbulent history as well as its current geopolitical position did not allow Kishinev to
ignore Moscow. Aside from the obvious energy dependence, Moldova had to struggle with the
„frozen conflict” on its territory, that was controlled military by the outside

forces.

Understandably, those two factors were determinative in forming foreign policy toward Russian
Federation. The small, impoverished and politically unstable country could not resist the
influences of the “superpower in the territory of former Soviet Union” that uses its energy
domination and military presence to sabotage the domestic and foreign politics.356 On top of that
Moldova deeply depended on the export of agriculture products to Russia with its wine industry
estimated to account for somewhere near 25 percent of Moldova's gross domestic product (GDP),
with 80 percent of that wine exported to Russia.
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Therefore, at least for now, with no strong

support from the West the hands of the Moldovan leaders are tied and they have to adjust their
political decision with an eye on the Kremlin.
Russia, on the other hand, was simply pursuing its own numerous interests in the region.
The first was to maintain the historical ties with the region inherited from Russian Empire and
Soviet Union, which included the economic resources and the population of Russian desent.
However, it is important to notice the fact that Russian actions had nothing to do with neoimperialist ambition or expansionism. The leaders in Moscow want to ensure that Moldova will
stay within the Russian sphere of influence and thwart the danger of closer relations between
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Moldova Western organizations like NATO or EU. That is why that the political and economic
leverage will probably remained the major tool in Russian foreign policy toward Moldova.
Is it possible to break the impasse in the Russian-Moldovan relations? The only answer
would be the intensified involvement of Western players, especially the European Union. Taking
under consideration Kishinev’s current efforts to come closer to European integration, EU
engagement in the region is the only way to balance Russian influence. However, this would
require the European states to engage strongly in the region, especially in the settling the
Transnistrian conflict. But even more importantly this would require the EU to formulate a new
strategy toward the region that would be linked more with Russian policy toward the “shared
neighborhood”. For now the lack of communication between Brussels and Moscow results in
causing political crisis in the region that is sandwiched between two regional centers.
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